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The first question that must be confronted in a comparative study
is: what is the purpose of making a comparison? Quite different pur-
poses may be served, some more useful or more ambitious than others,
but the purposes sought to be achieved inevitably shape the manner in
which the comparison is made.
In labor law and labor relations one of the most helpful uses of
comparison is to provide a broader perspective from which we can criti-
cally examine our own legal rules and institutional practices. By study-
ing the Swedish system, a working and reasonably successful system,
we may recognize that legal rules and principles we in the United
States have unquestionably accepted as fundamental are not essential,
for Sweden functions and prospers with quite different rules. We may
recognize that certain of our practices and institutions in union-man-
agement relations are more products of historical events and perpetu-
ated by habit than compelled by economic forces or adopted as social
choices. At the same time we may realize that legal rules and institu-
tional structures are interrelated in ways we had not suspected and that
particular rules have social consequences we have not considered. The
comparative perspective helps us to see through the myths of our own
system, to uncover the hidden premises on which we build, and to see
more clearly the realities of our system and its special characteristics.
Comparison that leads to greater self-understanding can suggest
constructive changes, changes otherwise unthought or even unthinkable.
When hidden premises are examined critically and accepted principles
are questioned skeptically, we can see the need and potential for
change. Examining another system opens our minds to other premises
and forces our imagination to find new forms and devices to meet
newly felt needs. We cannot, of course, blindly borrow from another
system; that which works well in Sweden -will not necessarily work well
in the United States. Awareness of the differences between the two sys-
t Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. B.S. 1939,
J.D. 1942, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1946, J.S.D. 1952, Columbia University.
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tems warns against such simplistic copying or piecemeal transplanting
of legal rules. But that same awareness of differences can instruct us in
shaping solutions that are suitable to our own system.
Labor law, more than many other areas of law, is the product of
conscious creation and social choice. Our basic labor statutes were not
products of an evolutionary process but were deliberately designed as
instruments of change. They declared new social policies and estab-
lished new legal principles to meet newly felt needs. Some, like the
Wagner Act,' the Landrum-Griffin Act,2 and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act' were American inventions that provided ideas for changes
in other countries. Others, such as workman's compensation, unem-
ployment insurance, and much safety and protective legislation, drew
on principles and rules found in earlier European legislation. Current
proposals concerning plant closures, unjust dismissal, work groups, and
employee representation on corporate boards are inspired or reinforced
by foreign experience. We can learn much more about where we are
and what directions we might take by comparisons with other systems.
The comparison here is between "worker participation" in Swe-
den and the United States. "Worker participation" is used in a broad
sense to include all those structures and processes through which em-
ployees have a voice in the decisions of the enterprise that affect their
working lives, from negotiation of national agreements to consultation
of work groups on the shop floor. "Industrial democracy" or
"codetermination" might also be used, although these terms are some-
times used with broader or narrower meanings. Comparison here is
limited to the private sector; comparison in the public sector would re-
quire a different framework of analysis because American law draws
basic distinctions between the two sectors.
The reasons for focusing on this aspect of labor law are two-fold.
First, studying worker participation requires us to examine the central
principles of labor law and the processes of decision-making by labor
market institutions. It therefore provides a good vantage point for view-
ing labor law and industrial relations systems generally. A second rea-
son for focusing on worker participation is that, in my view, increasing
worker participation was one of the original purposes of the Wagner
Act, is one of the ceitral functions of collective bargaining, and should
be a major social goal of labor law. It has also been one of the central
goals of the Swedish labor movement and has been given concrete ex-
' National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
2 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-
531 (1982).
' Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
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pression in the 1976 Act on Codetermination at Work4 [the MBL]. To
obtain a clearer understanding in both Sweden and the United States as
to the methods by which this goal may be achieved and the effectiveness
of each system in achieving it, it is useful to ask to what extent and in
what way do the Swedish and American systems of labor relations and
labor law provide employees with the ability to participate in the deci-
sions that affect their working lives?
Any attempt to make such a comparison is a risky undertaking, for
inevitably I see the Swedish system from an American perspective, bur-
dened by unconscious American assumptions. It is obviously impossible
for one who has not lived and worked within an industrial relations
system to have a full understanding of the complexities and nuances of
that system. Because of incomplete knowledge, relevant considerations
may be overlooked or misconstrued. More important, deep-running so-
cial attitudes, political values, or historical traditions may not be fully
or accurately sensed. The comparative study itself sharpens our aware-
ness of these dangers. As one realizes how much he has failed to under-
stand his own system, he must fear that he has failed to understand the
other. But the value of comparison remains, for comparison provides a
framework and focus outside either system for viewing both.
I. SOME BASIC SIMILARITIES
When one first examines the central legal principles and institu-
tional structures of worker participation in the United States and Swe-
den, one is struck by certain basic similarities. This is particularly true
when one compares them with, for example, the German system. 5
First, participation in both the United States and Sweden is based
on the legal principle of freedom of choice of employees. Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act,' enacted in 1935, declares, "Em-
ployees shall have the right to form, join or assist labor organizations,
[and] to bargain through representatives of their own choosing."7 Sec-
tion 3 of the Swedish Act on the Right of Association and Negotiation,8
" Lag om Medbest~mmande i arbetslivet, den 10 juni 1976 (Act on the Joint
Regulation of Working Life) [hereinafter cited as MBL], translated in F. SCHMIDT,
LAW AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 234-46 (1977). See Victorin, Co-deter-
mination in Sweden: The Union Way, 2 J. COMp. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 111, 116-27
(1979).
5 See Summers, Worker Participation in the U.S. and West Germany: A Compar-
ative Study from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367 (1980).
6 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982).
7 Id. § 157.
8 Lag om Frennngs~ch f6rhandlingsr~itt den 11 September 1936 (Act Respecting
the Right of Association and the Right of Collective Bargaining), translated in F.
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enacted the following year, declares, "The right of association shall not
be infringed, and an association shall not be bound to tolerate any in-
fringement of the right of association which constitutes interference
with its activities."' Although the right of association is not absolute
and has different legal and practical contours in the two countries, 0 it
is a common dominant principle.
In both countries participation is through collective negotiations;
whether there are to be collective negotiations and what union is to act
as representative, in principle, depends on the free choice of the em-
ployees. Further, selection of those who are to serve as negotiators is
through union procedures determined by union members.11 This con-
trasts with the German system, which legally establishes work councils,
requires that one be created in each workshop of more than five em-
ployees, and prescribes its make-up and functions.1 2
Second, in both the United States and Sweden participation at all
levels is through the union, and representation at the enterprise or
plant level is tied closely to the union that makes the collective agree-
ment. In the United States the majority union is the exclusive represen-
tative for purposes of negotiating collective agreements, and the em-
ployer is prohibited by law from negotiating with anyone other than
the majority union on matters concerning "rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, [and] other conditions of employment."13 In addition,
most collective agreements give the contracting union exclusive control
over grievances arising under the agreement.14 In Sweden collective
SCHMIDT, THE LAW OF LABOUR RELATIONS IN SWEDEN 251-58 (1962).
0 Lag om Fbrennngsbch forhandlingsritt den 11 September 1936 (Act Respecting
the Right of Association and the Right of Collective Bargaining), translated in F.
SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 251. This protection was carried over in §§ 7-9 of the MBL
in 1976. See id. at 235.
10 See Summers, Freedom of Association and Compulsory Unionism in Sweden
and the United States, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 647 (1964).
11 See General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1969)("[T]he
right of employees . . . to choose whomever they wish to represent them in formal
labor negotiations is fundamental to the statutory scheme.")
12 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (1972). See also M. PELTZER, BETRIEBSvERFAS-
SUNGSGESETZ, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 15-38, 147-70 (2d ed. 1977).
See generally M. WEISS, BETRIEBSVERFASSUNGSGESETZ, EIN KOMMENTAR FOR
STUDIUM UND PRAXIS (1978).
iS National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). See also J.I.
Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338-39 (1944) (individual contracts are pushed aside
once union becomes exclusive bargaining representative); Order of R.R. Telegraphers
v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 346-47 (1944) (under Railway Labor
Act of 1926, company may not negotiate individual contracts without first approaching
employees' exclusive bargaining representative).
14 See, e.g., Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420
U.S. 50, 69-70 (1975); cf. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337 (1944) (collective
agreement supercedes terms of individual contracts); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
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agreements are negotiated by national unions on an industry-wide ba-
sis, 5 and under the 1976 Codetermination Act'16 [MBL] the legal right
to codetermine at the enterprise level runs almost exclusively to unions
that have collective agreements." The only exception occurs when the
problem involves only individuals belonging to another union. In
neither country is there a dual structure, as in Germany, where wages
and other economic terms are negotiated by the union in a national or
area agreement while decisions at the enterprise and plant level are
negotiated or decided by works councils that are not a part of the union
but are created by statute and are legally independent of the union. 9
Third, in both the United States and Sweden, the effectiveness of
the employees' voice in decisions of the enterprise depends in the first
instance on negotiation, but depends ultimately on economic force.
Whether the employees' voice will be heard and prevail depends on the
union's ability to persuade the employer, either at the bargaining table
or by the economic pressure of a strike. In the United States all matters
are generally settled in the same negotiations, with a comprehensive
collective agreement determining not only wages and other economic
terms, but also the limits on management prerogatives. The strike is
available to resolve all of these issues when the collective agreement is
made. Although the collective agreement normally includes a no-strike
clause, the parties may limit the contractual no-strike obligation to per-
mit certain disputes, such as those over safety and production starx-
dards, to be resolved by strikes during the contract term. In Sweden
collective agreements have historically been limited to wages and other
economic terms, but the 1976 statute contemplated that these negotia-
tions might be enlarged to include "codetermination subjects," or the
negotiation of a general "codetermination agreement" providing for
union participation in management decisions, with the strike available
NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 684 (1944) (negotiations directly with employees rather than
with union is unfair labor practice).
25 See T. JOHNSTON, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN SWEDEN 235-36 (1962); El-
vander, Sweden, in TOWARDS INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 133-34 (B. Roberts ed. 1979).
18 MBL, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 234-46.
17 MBL §§ 11, 12, 32, 34, 35, 38. Section 11, for example, provides, "Before an
employer decides an important alteration to his activity, he shall, on his own initiative,
negotiate with an organisation of employees in relation to which he is bound by collec-
tive agreement." F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 235.
I See MBL § 13, translated in F.SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 236. In that case the
employer is required to negotiate with the union to which the particular employees
belong. The duty is the same as that owed to a union with a collective agreement.
", See Leminsky, Worker Participation: The German Experience, in LABOR RE-
LATIONS IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES: ISSUES AND PROBLEMS 146-49
(1980); Summers, supra note 5, at 373-74.
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to resolve all of these issues.2" Even though a collective agreement on
economic terms is signed, creating a statutory no-strike obligation, the
union may reserve the right to strike during the contract term on
codetermination issues not resolved by the agreement. 2
Again, this contrasts with the German system, under which the
works council has the right to negotiate on a wide range of matters but
has no right to strike. However, on many matters of the greatest impor-
tance, if no agreement is reached, the dispute is resolved through bind-
ing arbitration by a neutral person.2
In spite of the legal similarities between the Swedish and Ameri-
can systems, even a casual familiarity with the practical operation of
the two makes one aware that they are quite different. To make any
meaningful comparison, it is necessary to go beyond these broadly
stated legal principles. The legal rules may be less similar than they
first appear, and even parallel legal rules may have quite different
practical consequences in different institutional settings. Other less ap-
parently relevant legal rules may intervene, and the law may be less
important than social and economic factors.
II. SOME SIGNIFICANT CONTRASTS
For the purpose of helping us see our own system more clearly,
contrasts in the practical operation of the two systems may be more
revealing than the similarities in their legal rules. Contrasts provoke
questions as to reasons for the differences, and a search for those rea-
sons may lead to new insights and clearer understandings. The focus
here is on two significant contrasts: differences in the completeness of
coverage and in the centralization of the two systems.
A. Completeness of Coverage
The most marked and probably most significant factor distinguish-
ing the practical operation of the two systems is the extent to which
20 See Victorin, supra note 4, at 118-27. The term codetermination subjects refers
here to those areas of industrial relations or subjects for negotiation embraced by the
MBL that were not customarily dealt with by collective agreements on wages and other
economic terms prior to the passage of the MBL. The term codetermination agreement
refers to those agreements negotiated under § 32 of the MBL.
21 See MBL § 44, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 241-42. It is uncer-
tain whether the union could, by express provision in the collective agreement, preserve
the right to strike on all codetermination issues, regardless of whether they were specifi-
cally mentioned during negotiations or whether it is necessary that the specific matters
be raised in the negotiations.
22 Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, §§ 76, 87, 91, 94, 95, 98, 109, 112; see also M.
PELTZER, supra note 12, at 153-58.
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they cover all employees in the labor market. In Sweden ninety-five
percent of all blue-collar workers and seventy-five percent of all sala-
ried employees are members of unions, and almost every employer in
every branch of the economy is covered by a collective agreement.23 As
a result, almost every employee in Sweden is included in the participa-
tion system; coverage is, for practical purposes, complete. 24 In the
United States fewer than twenty-five percent of those in the employed
work force are union members, 25 and fewer than thirty percent are cov-
ered by collective agreements. 26 This means that in the United States
seventy percent of the employees in the labor market have no collective
voice, either in determining their terms and conditions of employment
or in influencing the decisions of the enterprises in which they work.
This incomplete coverage in the United States reflects in part the
operation of the basic legal principle of freedom of choice, subject to
majority rule. Whether there is to be collective bargaining and which
union is to act as representative are decided by the majority of the em-
ployees in the bargaining unit.2' Those bargaining units, whether de-
termined by the National Labor Relations Board or by agreements of
the parties, typically are relatively small. Most units are limited to a
single employer and are commonly confined to a single plant or work-
place.28 Even within a single plant, separate units will often exist for
blue-collar workers and white-collar workers and for special craft and
23 See L. FORSEBXCK, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT IN SWEDEN
30 (1976). Most blue-collar workers are organized in national unions affiliated with
the Swedish Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, or LO).
Most white-collar workers are organized in national unions affiliated with either the
Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO) or the Confederation of Profes-
sional Associations (SACO/SR). There are only a few small unions outside these feder-
ations. See F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 17-20; Victorin, supra note 4, at 111-12.
24 Section 26 of the MBL provides that the collective agreement is binding on the
members of the employers' association and the union concluding the agreement. F.
SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 238. An employer is bound regardless of how many of his
employees are members of the union, and he is obligated to apply the agreement to
employees who are not members of the union unless the agreement expressly provides
otherwise. See F. SCHMIDT, LbNTAGARRXTT 39-40 (1978). The practical effect is that
collective agreements cover all of the employees of members of the employers' associa-
tion, whether or not they are union members.
25 DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS: 1982-83 EDITION 1 (C. Gifford
ed. 1982).
26 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 2079, DI-
RECTORY OF NATIONAL LABOR UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979 at 59,
73-74 (1980) [hereinafter cited as DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL LABOR UNIONS].
27 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1982).
28 In 1978 there were more than 175,000 collective agreements covering a total of
approximately 25 million employees. DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL LABOR UNIONS,
supra note 26, at 74. In 1980 the average number of voters in the units in which the
NLRB held elections was 56. Three-fourths of all units had fewer than 59 voters. 45
NLRB ANN. REP. 18 (1980).
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professional employees."9 The coverage of collective agreements is in-
complete because in the great majority of workplaces a union is not
able to show the thirty percent support among the employees that is
necessary to obtain an election; and even when unions show sufficient
support, they lose more than half of the elections."0
Sweden, also starting with the legal principle of freedom of
choice-but one not qualified by majority rule"- ends with a collec-
tive bargaining system that covers practically all employees. Complete-
ness of coverage in Sweden cannot be explained, however, by the lack
of the majority rule principle. This factor-employees signing agree-
ments when only a minority of employees are members- is of only
marginal importance in bringing employees within the collective bar-
gaining system. Nor can the completeness of coverage be explained by
other legal rules. Indeed, if the Swedish legal rules and enforcement
methods were transplanted to the United States, the level of unioniza-
tion here would, in all probability, be even lower. The explanation lies
in two nonlegal factors.
First, the plainly observable fact is that in Sweden an overwhelm-
ing majority of workers choose to join unions and support collective
bargaining, whereas in the United States a majority refuse to join un-
ions and, instead, vote to reject collective bargaining. How can we ex-
plain this great difference in the two countries? Partial explanations
may be found in cultural attitudes toward joining organizations, collec-
tive action, and social responsibility, but these seem inadequate to ex-
plain the magnitude of the difference.
The second and more crucial factor determining the level of union-
ization and collective bargaining is, in my view, the attitudes and prac-
tices of employers. In the United States the major cause of the low level
of unionization is the hostility of employers to unions and their efforts
to defeat collective bargaining. Some employers systematically and de-
liberately violate the law, using repressive and coercive actions that ef-
fectively deprive employees of any freedom of choice.32 They are pre-
2 See generally J. ABODEELY, R. HAMMER & A. SANDLER, THE NLRB AND
THE APPROPRIATE BARGAINING UNIT (rev. ed. 1981) (discussing criteria used by
NLRB to determine the appropriate bargaining unit).
20 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 16 (1980).
SI A Swedish employer, unlike an American employer, can legally sign a collective
agreement that effectively governs all of his employees even though only a few or even
none of them are members of the union. F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 102, 123.
32 A brief sketch of one employer's repeated violations can be found in NLRB v.
J.P. Stevens & Co., 563 F.2d 8, 25 (2d Cir. 1977), described by the court as "Stevens
XVIII in the long list of Stevens litigation." See also Kovach, J.P. Stevens and the
Struggle for Union Organization, 29 LAB. L.J. 300, 308 (1978) (during fourteen-year
period, NLRB found Stevens guilty of unfair labor practices in fifteen separate cases
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pared to violate the law in order to prevent unionization in spite of
legal sanctions that, by Swedish standards, are quite severe.33 Although
the majority of employers stay within the limits of the law, they will go
to its very boundaries to persuade employees not to join unions and to
reject collective bargaining. When a collective bargaining election is
scheduled, the employer will mount a massive publicity campaign, hold
meetings of employees during work time, send letters to the employees'
spouses, and organize community pressures to defeat the union in the
election. 4
Both of the major employers' organizations-the National Associa-
tion of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce-are openly and
actively anti-union, sponsoring conferences, training sessions, and con-
sulting services for employers for the declared purpose of preserving or
reclaiming the union free environment. 5 These programs and activities
are endorsed and supported by employers who have had established
collective bargaining relationships for more than forty years.
The contrast between these attitudes and practices of American
employers and those of Swedish employers need not be elaborated
upon. It would be a rare employer in Sweden who would try to dis-
courage its employees from joining a union or persuade them that they
would be better off without collective bargaining. And such an em-
ployer would be considered a pariah by other employers.
The attitudes of employers directly affect the readiness of employ-
ees to join unions because employees are subject to subtle fear, a sense
of subservience, and appeals to loyalty. In addition, the dominant atti-
tudes of employers are reflected in the public press, political debate,
and discussions at all levels. These attitudes significantly shape, if not
determine, the general social attitudes toward unions and collective
and awarded over $1.3 million in back pay).
" When employees are discriminated against because of union membership or
activity, the standard remedy is reinstatement with back pay. In 1980 the NLRB
awarded $32.1 million of back pay to 15,566 workers. In addition, 10,033 workers
were offered reinstatement. Other violations are subject to cease and desist orders, and
repeated violations may be punished as contempt of court. 45 NLRB ANN. REP. 13
(1980). In Sweden back pay awards have been few and small. Although fines can be
levied, prior to 1976 these were nominal. Under the MBL, damages awarded for an
employer's failure to negotiate have, in some cases, been very large.
"I For a description of these tactics, see Oversight Hearings on the National La-
bor Relations Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of
the House Comm. on Education and Labor on H.R. 8408, H.R. 8409, H.R. 8110
and H.R. 12822, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) (statement of Stephen I. Schlossberg,
General Counsel, United Auto Workers).
See Pressures in Today's Workplace, Oversight Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Labor-Management Relations of the Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Robert A. Georgine).
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bargaining.
I would suggest that the high level of union membership in Swe-
den is due to a broad social consensus that collective bargaining is the
appropriate method for managing the labor market. Critical to that
consensus is the employers' acceptance of collective bargaining. There is
no such acceptance of collective bargaining by American employers, but
rather an open and active hostility to unions. This has created a social
climate that discourages employees from joining unions. This difference
in social consensus, made possible because of employer attitudes, largely
explains the difference in the completeness of coverage of worker par-
ticipation processes.
This only pushes our inquiry back another step, for we must now
ask why the attitudes of Swedish employers are so different from em-
ployers in the United States. History suggests a partial answer.
Sweden, at the turn of the century, had its share of bitter strikes,
and many Swedish employers discharged union members, locked out
employees until they abandoned their union, or refused to bargain col-
lectively. 36 In 1906, in the face of continuing conflict, the Swedish Em-
ployers Confederation (SAF) and the Confederation of Swedish Trade
Unions (LO) worked out the so-called December Compromise,37 which
shaped Swedish labor relations for seventy years .
3
The Compromise took the form of an agreement between the par-
ties that the following provision would be included in every collective
agreement between member associations of SAF and LO:
Reserving the observance of other rules in the agree-
ment, the employer is entitled to direct and distribute the
work, to hire and dismiss workers at will, and not to employ
workers whether they are organized or not.
The right of association shall be left inviolate on both
sides.
If the workers are of opinion [sic] that a dismissal has
taken place in circumstances which can be interpreted as an
attack upon the right of association, they may, before further
steps are taken, call, through their organization, for an in-
"6 See generally C. HALLENDORFF, SVENSKA ARBETSGIFVAREF6RENINGEN, 1902-
1927, at 9-12 (1927); T. JOHNSTON, supra note 15, at 124; T. LINDBOM, DEN SVEN-
SEA FACKF6RENINGSRORELSENS UPPKOMST, OCH TIDIGARE HISTORIA 1872-1900, at
168-73 (1938).
'7 The December Compromise of 1906, translated in F. SCHmIDT, supra note 8,
at 26-27.
38 See generally A. ADLERCREUTZ, KOLLEKTIVAVTALET, STUDIER 6VER DESS
TILLKOMSTHISTORIA 344-48 (1954); C. HALLENDORFF, supra note 36, at 79-83.
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vestigation for the vindication of their rights. 9
One-half of the Compromise was the employers' explicit accept-
ance of unions and collective bargaining. The organized employers, in
both symbolic and practical terms, placed their stamp of approval on
unions and promoted the extension of collective bargaining.40 SAF re-
fused to support employers who had not allowed their employees to join
unions.4' More important, it negotiated agreements that covered work-
ers who previously had not been organized. National agreements were
negotiated in industries that were only partially organized, and those
agreements covered employers in which only a minority of employees
were union members.
Acceptance of collective bargaining did not represent capitulation
by the employers. The other side of the Compromise was acceptance by
the unions that there would be included in all collective agreements
paragraph 23 (later paragraph 32) of the SAF statutes, which had been
included in the December Compromise, providing that "the employer is
entitled to direct and distribute the work, to hire and dismiss workers at
will, and to employ workers whether they are organized or not."42 The
employer thereby retained full control over decisions about who should
be assigned to what work, who should be promoted and transferred,
who was to be laid off or discharged, and how work was to be assigned
and performed.
43
With the December Compromise, organized employers approved
unions and collective bargaining, discouraged anti-union practices, and
extended the reach of collective agreements. The employers thus made
possible and encouraged the growth of Swedish unions, and they ulti-
mately helped create the social consensus that workers should join un-
ions. In return, unions agreed to limit collective bargaining to wages,
hours, and other economic terms. They gave up their claims to
39 The December Compromise of 1906, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 8,
at 26-27.
40 J. WESTERSTAHL, SVENSK FACKFORENINGSR6RELSE 150 (1945). The Decem-
ber Compromise did not represent a reversal of the policy of SA. It had in fact ac-
cepted collective bargaining as unavoidable and rejected policies and practices of trying
to destroy unions by violations of freedom of association. C. HALLENDORFF, Supra note
36, at 31, 41, 57, 74.
41 T. BRESKY, J. SCHERMAN & I. SCHMID, MED SAF VID RODRET: GRANSKN-
ING AV EN KAMPORGANISATION 34 (1981).
" The December Compromise of 1906, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 8,
at 26.
'" B. SCHILLER, LO, PARAGRAF 32 OCH F6RETAGSDEMOKRATIN (1974). For a
discussion of the impact of paragraph 32 on Labor Court decisions giving employers
the right to make decisions concerning working conditions and control over the work-
place and employees, see Victorin, supra note 4 at 119-20.
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codetermination on other matters, even those of great importance to em-
ployees, such as assignment of work and dismissal. Employers agreed to
accept unions when the unions agreed not to interfere with manage-
ment of the enterprise.
This pairing of a limitation on the role of unions with a recogni-
tion of management's prerogatives has been a dominant characteristic of
the Swedish model of labor relations. It was a precondition and unspo-
ken assumption of the famous Basic Agreement of 1938"" between SAF
and LO, which laid down guidelines for union-employer relations, pre-
scribed rules for economic conflict, and provided the framework for
forty years of labor peace."5 Article III of the Agreement required the
employer to notify the union of planned dismissals and allowed the
union to call for negotiations and for investigation by the Labor Market
Board. The ultimate right of decision, however, rested with the em-
ployer. The Works Council Agreements of 1946 and 1966 between the
employer and union confederations, which set up "joint enterprise
councils" to promote industrial democracy, superceded the Basic Agree-
ment's provisions regarding dismissal and laying off of workers. They
provided only for information and consultation; the right of decision
remained with the employer., 6
The single significant encroachment on paragraph 32, prior to the
1970's, was the 1964 amendment to the Basic Agreement, which lim-
ited the employer's right to discharge individual employees and pro-
vided for binding arbitration on the issue of whether the employer had
"material grounds" for discharge. 47 Although LO continuously argued
for industrial democracy during this period and repeatedly made de-
mands to limit or do away with paragraph 32, there was no willingness
to use industrial action to curb management prerogatives.4" The unions
'" Basic Agreement Between the Swedish Employers' Confederation and the Con-
federation of Swedish Trade Unions, dated 20 December 1938, as amended in 1947,
translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 263-77.
46 B. SCHILLER, supra note 43, at 54-64.
46 T. BRESKY, J. SCHERMAN & I. SCHMID, supra note 41, at 73; B. SCHILLER,
supra note 43, at 65-71, 87-88. The weakness and ineffectiveness of works councils
were emphasized by LO in LO, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY
THE 1971 LO CONGRESS 241, and in CO-DETERMINATION ON THE FOUNDATION OF
SOLIDARITY, A REPORT TO THE 1976 CONGRESS OF THE SWEDISH TRADE UNION
CONFEDERATION, at 60, in which it was said that "works councils in their present
form have come to the end of their usefulness."
4 Huvudavtalet (Basic Agreement), Kap. III, § 4. This was negotiated as a part
of the central wage negotiations, the only occasion on which the unions attempted to
negotiate any limitation on paragraph 32, although paragraph 32 was included in col-
lective agreements on wages.
4 See, e.g., DEMOKRATI I F6RETAGEN, RAPPORT TILL LO-KONGRESSEN (1972);
LO, FACKFbRENINGSR6RELSEN OCH NARINGSLIVET 177-83 (1941); B. SCHILLER,
supra note 43, at 37-53.
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accepted, however grudgingly, the employer's right to decide matters
outside the economic terms regulated by the collective agreement.49
In sharp contrast, American unions have never conceded to em-
ployers such prerogatives. From their earliest days unions have de-
manded and struck for contractual provisions requiring employees to be
union members, thereby limiting the employer's freedom to choose
workers.50 Collective agreements have customarily prescribed the cate-
gories of employees to be used to perform certain work, limited the kind
of work an employee could be required or permitted to do according to
the employee's job classification, and regulated the number of employ-
ees to be used in certain operations. Unions have insisted on regulating
job assignments, the transfer of employees, and promotions, and few
unions would sign an agreement that lacked either a seniority clause
regulating lay-offs and rehires or a clause prohibiting discharge without
just cause."1 Unions have engaged in bitter and protracted strikes to
obtain these provisions and many others that limit management
control.5"
I would suggest that one of the reasons American employers have
resisted unions in ways that Swedish employers have not is that Ameri-
can unions have never accepted the limitations of paragraph 32. Ameri-
can employers have viewed the union as a threat to their control over
management of the enterprise, a threat that Swedish employers have
not felt-or hadn't until the 1970's. One reason collective bargaining
covers only a minority of workers in the United States is that unions
have insisted on substantial limitations on management prerogatives.
Coverage in Sweden is nearly complete in part because unions, for sev-
'9 B. SCHILLER, supra note 43, at 52-53.
50 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111 (1842) (allowing
union to enforce closed shop to compel compliance with union pay scale); Gray v.
Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N.W. 663 (1903) (members of trades
council may legally refuse to work with nonunion employees); National Protective
Ass'n v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902) (no cause of action exists for
employee dismissed by employer under pressure from union seeking closed shop); J.
COMMONS, TRADE UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS 54-56, 94-95 (1905). Early col-
lective agreements established lines of promotions for butchers, id. at 233-34, and the
printers union insisted that only printers should operate linotype machines, id. at 269-
70.
"I See S. SLIcHTER, J. HEALY & E. LIvERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT (1960).
5' On the railroads, repeated disputes, some leading to strikes and some to legisla-
tive resolution, have arisen over the number of persons required to operate diesel loco-
motives. Dock workers closed down shipping on the whole East Coast to prevent or
regulate the use of containers in loading ships. Steelworkers struck for months to pre-
serve work rules that limit management's discretion in assigning work and determining
the number of employees on work crews. Auto workers reserve the right to strike con-
cerning production standards and the speed of assembly lines, and they exercise it.
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enty years, did not challenge management control and thereby gained
employer acceptance and social support for collective bargaining.
Other reasons undoubtedly help to explain the difference in em-
ployers' attitudes toward unions in the United States and Sweden. One
is the lack of strong employers associations in the United States. In
Sweden almost all employers in the private sector are members of the
Swedish Employers Confederation and its national industry associa-
tion." These associations bargain on a national level and establish na-
tional wage patterns." In the United States there is no equivalent na-
tional employers association, and there are only a limited number of
employers associations that blanket a competitive market. The result is
that American employers know that any concessions that they make to
a union will not necessarily be matched by their competitors. Employ-
ers associations that cover various labor markets could help to dispel
employers' fears of wage competition from other employers.
Even when an industry is fully unionized, employers still prefer to
operate nonunion and continue to be hostile to union limitations on
management control. It is worth noting that as the SAF was being
formed in Sweden, the National Metal Trades Association and the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers Associations were formed in the
United States, but the latter promoted the "open shop" campaign that
urged denying employees freedom of association and rejecting collective
bargaining." The central goal of their program was to protect the right
of employers to hire and dismiss workers and to manage the work force
free of union control. In the United States national employers organiza-
tions have been among the most active and outspoken opponents of un-
ions and collective bargaining.
B. Centralization
The second marked difference between the Swedish and American
systems is their degree of centralization. The Swedish system of collec-
tive bargaining has been noted for its centralization, with national in-
dustry agreements negotiated between national unions and national em-
53 SAF has more than 37,000 members employing over 1,300,000 employees.
SvENSKA ARBETSGIVAREFdRENINGENS VERKSAMHET (1980). Independent employers'
associations cover cooperatives, banks, newspapers, and shipping. Provincial and local
governments are also represented by employers' associations. F. SCHMIDT, supra note
4, at 21-22.
" See T. JOHNSTON, supra note 15, at 78.
" See generally C. BONNETr, EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES: A STUDY OF TYPICAL ASSOCIATIONS (1922); R. HOXIE, TRADE UNIONISM
IN THE UNITED STATES 188-210 (1923); D. LESCOHIER & E. BRANDEIS, HISTORY OF
LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 274-302 (1935).
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ployers associations. Since the 1950's these have been negotiated within
the framework of master agreements negotiated between the union con-
federations and the employers' confederations covering almost the entire
private sector.56 In contrast, the American system is noted for its decen-
tralization, with collective agreements typically being negotiated on a
plant or enterprise level. The union structure in each country tends to
match the bargaining structure. Swedish unions are highly centralized,
with plant organizations weak or nonexistent; American unions are rel-
atively decentralized, with local unions playing a significant and often
autonomous role.
Decentralization in the United States is rooted in part in the legal
principle of employee free choice and in the way it operates in Ameri-
can labor relations. In the words of section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act, employees have the "right to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing. ' 57 To maximize freedom of
choice, subject to majority rule, the election or bargaining units are rel-
atively small, often splitting a single enterprise into a number of units.
The model on which the law is built-and the dominant pattern
in practice-is that each unit bargains separately, with the local union
negotiating its collective agreement and handling the grievances of em-
ployees in the unit. This is often done with little or no supervision or
control by the national union.
Although the law is a decentralizing force, it does not compel de-
centralization, for the law allows the parties to combine election units
into larger bargaining units, and they often do.5 General Motors has
more than a hundred plants, with each plant potentially a separate
unit. But in most plants the auto workers union is the majority union
for the blue-collar workers, and it negotiates a central agreement cover-
ing all those units in which it is the bargaining representative. The
steelworkers union bargains centrally with all of the major steel compa-
nies, and the teamsters union negotiates a National Master Freight
Agreement with an employers association covering hundreds of truck-
ing companies in over-the-road hauling. But even when there is a cen-
tral agreement, local agreements often exist on matters that require lo-
cal adaptation or do not require national uniformity.59
" Victorin, supra note 4, at 111-12. In the negotiations in April of 1983, this
process fractured as the largest union, the Metalworkers, broke ranks and concluded a
separate pay agreement with higher productivity-linked pay. See infra note 65.
57 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
58 See generally THE STRuCTURE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (A. Weber ed.
1961).
59 Livernash, Special and Local Negotiations in FRONTIERS OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 27, 27-49 (J. Dunlop & N. Chamberlain eds. 1967).
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Centralization in Sweden also has a taproot in the law-the legal-
ity of the sympathetic lockout.6" The tactic of SAF and its member
associations has always been to expand local or "point" strikes to in-
clude the entire industry or even a number of industries. The effect of
this was to place a heavy burden on the national unions and LO and
inevitably to draw them into the dispute. SAF has constantly pressed
for centralized negotiations in order to maintain a solid front and to
avoid competition; the sympathetic lockout was an effective instrument
for achieving that goal."1
The law is only one element contributing to centralization. Para-
graph 32, by limiting collective bargaining to wages and other economic
terms, made possible and encouraged bargaining by industry on a na-
tional level. Any local or regional variations in these terms that might
be required could be prescribed in a national industry agreement.
There was little need for supplementary local agreements on substan-
tial issues.
Comprehensiveness of unionization in Sweden, combined with
LO's wage policies, has also contributed to centralization. With more
than ninety percent of workers covered by collective bargaining, large
increases negotiated by one national union in one industry would be at
the expense of members of other unions in other industries, and compe-
tition between unions for increases would generate a spiral of wage
inflation. In the past the wage increases negotiated by unions had a
visible impact on the national economy and the ability of Swedish in-
dustry to compete in world markets. During the post-war years LO
came to recognize the need for a unified wage policy that would help
provide economic stability and full employment.6 2 Recommendations by
LO that its member national unions exercise wage restraints proved
ineffective. This resulted in resort to central negotiations between the
union and employer confederations that have now evolved to the stage
where national wage negotiations are tied to governmental changes in
social benefits and revisions in the tax system. 3 Central negotiations
have also been supported by LO to enable it to carry out its basic policy
of seeking through collective bargaining to serve the social purpose of
lifting the wages of employees in low wage industries, thereby reducing
R. FAHLBECK, PRAKTISK ARBETSRATT 126 (1981); C. HALLENDORFF, supra
note 36, at 79-83, 157-61; F. SCHMIDT, supra note 8, at 162.
61 A. HADENIUS, FACKLIG ORGANISATIONSUTVECKLING 19-27 (1976).
62 Id. at 68-96.
63 LO, LO 80-RAPPORTEN: RAPPORT TILL LO-KONGRESSEN 1981, at 27 (1981);
Jacobson, Vad hande under 198Oars konflikt?, in STORKONFLIKTEN 1980, at 30
(1981).
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disparities in earnings." This can be accomplished only through na-
tional interindustry bargaining.
65
It should be noted that none of these conditions that led to central-
ization in Sweden has existed in the United States. Until relatively re-
cently the sympathetic lockout was illegal6 and even now cannot be
used to compel central union control.67 There has never been a national
employers federation equivalent to SAF in the United States. As has
been pointed out, the national employers organizations have sought to
combat or fragment collective bargaining and have actively supported
legislation to prohibit industry-wide bargaining.6" There are employers
associations in particular industries such as steel, rubber, coal-mining,
construction, and various branches of transportation, but most of them
are loosely organized, and they have no links with each other.
69
Because only thirty percent of employees are covered by collective
agreements, unions can gain by negotiating increases at the expense of
the seventy percent not covered by collective agreements. Unions com-
pete with one another, each getting the most possible for its members.
A. HADENIUS, supra note 61, at 105-22.
65 Central negotiations show some signs of fragmenting. In 1983 LO announced
that it would not have centralized negotiations but would bargain by sectors. 110 EUR.
INDUS. REL. REV. 3 (1983). The Metal Workers, the largest LO union, did negotiate a
separate agreement for the metal industry. 112 EUR. INDUS. REL. REv. 8 (1983). The
other LO unions, however, made a central agreement to end a twelve-hour strike that
threatened a mass shutdown. The agreement followed the general pattern set by the
Metal Workers. 111 EUR. INDUS. REL. REv. 2 (1983). In December LO said that it
would not coordinate bargaining in the 1984 negotiations, 119 EUR. INDUS. REL. REV.
5 (1983), and the Metal Workers again negotiated separately in 1984, 121 EUR. IN-
DUS. REL. REV. 5 (1983). Whether decentralized bargaining without substantial coor-
dination by LO will prove feasible for a substantial period, however, is far from
certain.
" See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 283 (1965); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Lo-
cal 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 97 (1957); see also Meltzer, Lockouts Under the
LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 614 (1961).
6' This would be considered a violation of the employees' right "to bargain
through representatives of their own choosing," National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The employer cannot use any economic pressure to interfere with
the employees' free choice of bargaining representatives. See Detroit Newspaper Pub-
lishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 569, 571 (6th Cir. 1967) (stating that unstruck em-
ployers may not use a lockout to coerce unions into bargaining trough a multi-employer
bargaining unit).
6s See Iserman, The Labor Monopoly Problem: Gwinn-Fischer Bill Would Effect
Reforms, 38 A.B.A. J. 743 (1952). It should be emphasized that multi-employer bar-
gaining has been held not to violate the antitrust laws so long as it is limited to re-
quired subjects of bargaining and is not aimed at injuring competitors who are not
members of the employers' association. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
U.S. 657 (1965).
69 Inquiry into Multiemployer Association Bargaining and Its Impact on the Col-
lective-Bargaining Process: Hearings Before the General Subcomm. on Labor of the
House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1964) (statement of
James A. Suffridge, President of the Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, AFL-CIO).
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Each union considers itself autonomous, and there is little incentive or
pressure to develop a common wage policy. Wage increases, negotiated
by unions separately, do not have the same obvious impact on the na-
tional economy here as in Sweden, and, even if they did, unions could
not play the same role as their Swedish counterparts in shaping na-
tional economic policy.
Apart from the small size of bargaining units and the incomplete
coverage of collective agreements, the most crucial factor explaining the
decentralization of the American system is, in my view, the breadth of
subjects regulated by collective bargaining. Because collective agree-
ments in the United States reach subjects that relate so directly to
working conditions, the production processes, the kind of work per-
formed, and the employees' rights at the workplace, negotiations on
many of these matters must be decentralized. More important, the day-
to-day representation of employees when enforcing these provisions and
resolving the multitude of problems they present requires constant deal-
ing with the employer. This can be done effectively only at the work-
place and requires, in turn, resources and authority at the local level.
The result is that the local union is a substantial organization with
considerable autonomy and important decision-making functions. Be-
cause it deals with those problems of most immediate concern to the
employees and is constantly visible to the employees, the employees
tend to identify the local union as the relevant union and develop a
strong sense of loyalty to it. By the same token, local union officers and
committee members see their functions as important and see themselves
as representative of the employees in the plant. All of this builds a
sense of local independence and resistance to centralization.
This sketch somewhat overstates the difference between the two
systems. Central negotiations in Sweden are supplemented by national
industry agreements that allocate the "pot" reserved from general in-
creases to provide differential increases that will correct disparities and
implement the solidarity wage policy.70 At the local level piece rates are
negotiated, and the increases fixed at the central or industry level are
often negotiated upward, even though this runs counter to the principle
of central negotiation and the declared policies of the central organiza-
tions.7 1 On the other hand, in the United States some centrally negoti-
ated agreements, such as those in trucking, leave little room for local
7 A. VICTORIN, L6NENORMERING GENOM KOLLEKTIVAVTAL (1973).
71 S. EDLUND, TVISTEF6RHANDLINGAR PA ARBETSMARKNADEN 82 (1967); T.
JOHNSTON, supra note 15, at 258-59, 284-85; MEDBESTXMMANDE?: FACKLIGA
ERFARENHETER FRAN MBLs TVA FdRSTA AR, RAPPORT TILL TCO's 1979 KONGRESS
85-86.
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agreements, and in some unions local grievance procedures are subject
to substantial central control.
This description of the difference in centralization of the two sys-
tems has not taken into account the changes contemplated by the Swed-
ish Codetermination Act of 1976. This statute recognizes that worker
participation in decisions at the workplace or enterprise level requires a
substantial measure of decentralization. Section 14 provides that the
right to negotiate concerning changes in the activities of the enterprise
and changes in the work or employment conditions of an employee be-
long in the first instance to the local union organization or plant
"club." Only if agreement is not reached at that level is negotiation to
be taken up by the central organization. Similarly, under section 36,
the power to exercise the right of priority of interpretation, 2 and,
under section 38, the authority to negotiate on the use of subcontractors
belong in the first instance to the local organization."- Also, under sec-
tion 20, the employer has a duty to the local organization to provide
information concerning the activities of the enterprise.74
" The principle of "priority of interpretation" is a Swedish invention and is ex-
pressed in § 33 of the MBL in the following terms: "Where a collective agreement
contains provisions about a right of joint regulation . . . and. . . a dispute arises over
application of [a section 32] provision. . . , the employee party's view [of the interpre-
tation of the agreement] shall apply until that dispute has been finally tried." This
reverses the practice in the United States, where the employer acts and the union
grieves, with the employer's action continuing until the dispute is settled.
The principle as applied to the employees' duty to obey orders is stated in § 34,
which states, "Where, between an employer and an organisation of employees bound
by the same collective agreement, a dispute arises over a member's duty, under an
agreement, to perform work, the organisation's view [of the interpretation of the agree-
ment] shall apply until that dispute has been finally tried." This reverses the commonly
accepted principle that an employee must obey orders not dangerous to health and
safety and grieve the employer's violation.
The principle is not applied to disputes on pay or other remuneration. Under §
35, the employer's obligation is to call for negotiations, and, if the dispute is not settled,
the employer must bring an action in court. If the employer fails to do this, it must pay
the disputed amounts.
The sections are not applicable where there are "urgent reasons" against such
application or the union's views are unreasonable. MBL § 33.
73 Section 38, which restricts the employer's right to subcontract, provides,
"Before an employer decides to allow anybody to perform certain work on his behalf or
in his business without that person thereby being employed by him, he shall, on his
own initiative, negotiate with any organisation of employees in relation to which he is
bound by collective agreement for such work." Such prior negotiation is not required
when the work is "of short duration and of a temporary nature as requires special
skill" or if there are "extraordinary reasons against postponing the decision."
Under § 39, the union has a right to veto the subcontracting when the union
declares that it "may be taken to involve disregard of the law or of a collective agree-
ment for the work" or is "in conflict with what is generally approved of by the parties
concerned."
7" The duty to provide information imposed by § 20 is extremely broad, requiring
the employer to keep the union "continuously informed about how his activity is devel-
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The commission report proposing the statute 5 and all of the dis-
cussion leading up to the statute's passage emphasized that primary
authority and responsibility for codetermination was to be placed at the
local level. Both the unions and the employers seem to agree, at least in
principle, that the functions of codetermination contemplated by the
statute must be performed by the local organization dealing directly
with the individual employer."0 Various codetermination agreements
have been negotiated centrally, but these are all procedural agreements
outlining the procedures to be followed at the local level in discussing
and resolving various codetermination issues. The substantive results
are left to local negotiations.
7 7
The statute contemplates, in effect, that Swedish unions take a
long step in the direction of American unions. Collective agreements
concerning wages and other economic terms will presumably continue
to be negotiated centrally, but the wide range of management decisions
concerning the workplace and the enterprise encompassed by the statute
will be negotiated locally. This will require strong workplace organiza-
oping in respect of production and economically and about guide lines for personnel
policy" and to afford the union "an opportunity to examine books, accounts, and other
documents which concern his activity."
7' Demokrati pa arbetsplatsen, SOU 1975:1.
76 See, e.g., SOLIDARISK MEDBESTXMMANDE, RAPPORT TILL LO- KONGRESSEN
13, 44, 92, 109 (1976); SAF Circular Letter No. 5 (1977). In their proposals for a
central joint regulation agreement, LO/PTK stated in § 1, "Joint regulation will be
exercised by the local union organisations through negotiations and/or local joint regu-
lation and cooperation forms according to this agreement." The SAF proposal was
more emphatic, stating in its introduction, "It is, therefore, very important that it is the
employees in the enterprise who exercise the joint regulation."
77 These include joint regulation agreements for the state sector, state-owned en-
terprises, local and county governments, banks, and cooperatives. The protocol to the
Joint Regulation Agreement (MBA) for the state sector declared, "[T]he parties are
agreed that the center point in codetermination shall be at the local level." It provides
in § 14 that "disputes shall primarily be negotiated locally between such authority...
and the labor organization most immediately affected by the dispute." The local and
county MBA provides in § 2, "Codetermination ought therefore lie as near the em-
ployee as possible," and the bank MBA provides that the employer's obligation to ne-
gotiate and provide information under MBL may be fulfilled through the workplace
representative or the local dub. All of these joint regulation agreements provide for
local codetermination agreements.
It is claimed that in the state sector decentralization seems not to have occurred
because officials have failed to delegate authority so that there can be codetermination
at the local level. M. BERONIUS, MEDBESTXMMANDEAVTAL PA UNDANTAG? 106-07
(1981). The same author says that few local codetermination agreements have been
made. See id. at 153. Another report says that there are 140 local codetermination
agreements in the state sector, although many are of limited scope. See LAG & AVTAL,
May 27, 1981.
LO and TCO opposed the making of local joint regulation agreements in the SAF
sector until a central agreement was reached. This has slowed the progress at the local
level. L. LENNERLOF & P. HELLBERG, MEDBESTAMMANDE ENLIGT LAG, VAD BLEV
DET? SAMMANFATrANDE SLUTRAPPORT 70 (1979).
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tions, for they will be performing functions similar to, but even more
extensive and burdensome than, those of American local unions because
of the breadth of codetermination subjects. More important, they must
be given the power to make decisions because the national unions will
not be able to oversee most of the decisions that affect workers.
If American experience is any guide, creating a local level of deci-
sion-making may significantly change the centralized character of
Swedish unions. Under codetermination, the matters of most immediate
importance to the employees will be negotiated at the local level by
local representatives. Union members in Sweden will increasingly come
to look upon the local organization that deals with their day-to-day
needs as their union and see the national union as a remote entity that
every year or two negotiates the leftovers from central negotiations. To
be sure, the local organization will be a part of the national union and
legally subject to its control. But the local organization with its in-
creased functions, increased importance, and the increased loyalty of its
members may assert and exercise a substantial degree of independence
from the national union.
This probably overstates the decentralization that will occur, at
least in the near future, for unions currently have no organization at
most workplaces. The base level of organization is the district
(avdelnin), and one of the consequences of past centralization is that
now each of these often covers large areas and hundreds of work-
places.78 In larger establishments, dubs or sections may be organized.
These may be quite active and effective organizations, although their
existence is not recognized in many union statutes, and they have few,
if any, financial resources.79 As a general rule no dub is formed unless
there are at least ten members of the particular union. This means that
for both blue-collar and salaried employees to have clubs there must be
more than twenty employees. Membership figures for SAF show that
eighty-three percent of its members have fewer than twenty-five em-
ployees.80 Where no club exists, a contract representative may be desig-
78 A. HADENUS, supra note 61, at 161-67. Half the LO members are in districts
of more than 4,000 members, and a third are in districts of 5,000 members. "For them,
clubs or sections are a necessity if an ordinary member is to be able to take part in
meetings." LO, LO 80-RAPPORTEN: RAPPORT TILL LO-KONGRESSEN 1981, at 112
(1981).
"I One exception is Metallindustriarbetaref6rbundt. For information on the weak-
ness and absence of clubs, see KALLSTR6m, LoKALA KOLLEKTIVAVTAL 22 (1979).
go SVENSKA ARBETSGIVAREF6RENINGENS VERKSAMHET 3 (1980). The total
membership is 37,069. Of these, 19,141 had fewer than five employees, 5,587 had be-
tween six and ten employees, and 5,994 had between 11 and 25 employees. These
employers had 14% of the employees within SAF. It should be pointed out that many
small employers are not members of SAF.
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nated from among the employees, but the nearest thing to a local or-
ganization is the district, which is a part of the present centralized
structure. Any effective decentralization will have to come from
strengthening clubs in relatively large establishments.
III. MEASURES OF PARTICIPATION
The similarities and contrasts outlined in the preceding Parts pro-
vide a background for comparing more directly the extent of employee
participation in the American and Swedish systems at the present time.
To measure participation, three questions must be asked: (1) In what
decisions concerning their work and the activities of the enterprise do
employees have a voice? That is, what is the scope of subjects for par-
ticipation? (2) How are employees' voices heard in the decision-making
process? More pointedly, how effective is their voice in influencing the
decisions of management? (3) Because participation is almost entirely
through representatives, how much voice do employees have in deter-
mining what their representatives do on their behalf?
A. The Scope of Participation
The National Labor Relations Act requires employers to negotiate
with the majority union on "wages, hours and other terms and condi-
tions of employment."81 These words are interpreted to reach beyond
economic terms to include practically all matters directly relating to the
employees' work:82 scheduling of work,83 description of job duties and
job classifications, 8 assignment or transfer of employees to particular
jobs, 5 promotions,8  dismissals,87 job training,88 safety conditions,"9
81 National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(5), 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), 158(d)
(1982).
82 See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECrIVE BARGAINING 496-531 (1976).
83 See Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676,
691 (1965); Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring).
" See Crown Coach Corp., 155 N.L.R.B. 625 (1965) (supervisors' and foremen's
duties); Beacon Piece Dyeing and Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953 (1958)
(workloads).
85 See NLRB v. A-1 King Size Sandwiches, Inc., 732 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir.
1984); NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 869 (5th Cir.
1966); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 171, 173 (1980).
86 See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 247 N.L.R.B. 171, 173 (1980).
87 See National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 360 (1940).
See Flambeau Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 128, 134 (7th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1019 (1969); Genser v. IBEW Local 134, 522 F. Supp. 1153,
1161 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
8 See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 222 (1964) (Stew-
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contracting out of work,90 and even the kind of meals served in the
cafeteria.91
The duty to negotiate in the United States, however, does not
reach what the Supreme Court has described as "managerial decisions
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control."92 Thus an employer is
not required to negotiate a decision to close down a part of the enter-
prise, add a new facility, sell the business or merge with another, intro-
duce new technology, or change products.9 3 Although such decisions
have a direct and vital effect on the number of jobs or the work to be
performed, the employer has no duty to negotiate because the decisions
involve "the scope and directions of the enterprise."" Plainly, decisions
about matters that have less direct impact on employees, such as invest-
ment or withdrawal of capital, amount and form of financing, character
of advertising, or extent of sales promotion, are beyond the employer's
duty to bargain.95
In Sweden the scope of the legal duty to negotiate was undefined
and of no practical concern before 1976. The Act on Freedom of Asso-
ciation and Right of Negotiation of 1936 " established in section 4 the
right to negotiate "respecting the adjustment of conditions of employ-
ment and respecting the relations between employers and employees in
general."'97 Whether there was any limit on the subjects concerning
which the union could call for negotiations under this section was un-
certain.98 The unions' acceptance of the narrow scope of collective
agreements allowed by paragraph 32 made the issue irrelevant. In 1976
art, J., concurring); NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 1967).
,o See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
o1 See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 503 (1979).
02 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
9' First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676-77, 686 (1981);
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
" First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676-77 (1981). The
employer is required to bargain about the effects of such decisions. Id. at 681. This
includes bargaining about, for example, which employees will be dismissed and which
will be transferred, what retraining shall be provided, and what, if any,'severance pay
shall be given. See, e.g., NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 196
(3d Cir. 1965). But the employer is not required to notify the union in advance that
such a decision is being considered or to discuss with the union whether it should be
made. First Nat'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676-77.
0" Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
" Lag om Fdrennngsbch fo-rhandlingsritt den 11 September 1936 (Act Respecting
the Right of Association and the Right of Collective Bargaining), translated in F.
SCHmiDT, supra note 4 at 251-58 (1962).
0 Id. at 252.
,9 Demokrati pa arbetsplatsen, SOU 1975:1, at 272-73, 281.
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the Codetermination Act, in section 10, redefined the union's right of
negotiation to include "any matter relating to the relationship between
the employer and any member of the organization who is or has been
employed by that employer."99 These words were apparently not in-
tended to limit the scope of negotiations, and, at least for business en-
terprises in the private sector, the subjects on which the union can re-
quire the employer to negotiate are in practical terms unlimited.100
Section 11 of the statute imposes on the employer a so-called "pri-
mary duty" to negotiate-a duty to initiate negotiations before taking
action. 0 The primary duty can be contrasted with the "general duty"
to respond to the union's request for negotiations. The primary duty is
narrower than the general duty, but it still reaches far beyond any duty
imposed by American law. The Swedish employer must initiate negoti-
9' In full, § 10 provides,
An organisation of employees shall have a right to negotiate with an
employer on any matter relating to the relationship between the employer
and any member of the organisation who is or has been employed by that
employer. An employer shall have a corresponding right to negotiate with
an organisation of employees.
A right of negotiation under the first part of this section shall also be
enjoyed by the organisation of employees in relation to any organisation to
which the employer belongs, and by the employer's organisation in rela-
tion to the organisation of employees.
MBL § 10, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 235.
100 The subject area "ought to be made so wide that no questions are excluded
over which it is important for the workers to obtain influence." Demokratt pa
arbetsplatsen, SOU 1975:1, at 282. "In principle, the subject area should include every
question which concerns the relationship between employer and employee with respect
to the work and the activity within which the work is carried on. The question may
also relate to the enterprise's production, business management, work management or
other matters." Prop. 1975/76: 105, bil. 1, at 209. See also R. FAHLBECK, PRAKTISK
ARBETSRXTT 57-58 (1981).
101 Section 11 provides,
Before an employer decides on important alteration to his activity, he
shall, on his own initiative, negotiate with an organisation of employees in
relation to which he is bound by collective agreement. The same shall be
observed before an employer decides on important alteration of work or
employment conditions for employees who belong to the organisation.
If urgent reasons so necessitate, the employer may make and imple-
ment a decision before he has fulfilled his duty to negotiate under the first
part of this section.
MBL § 11, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 235-36. The "general duty" is
defined in § 12 as follows:
Should an organisation of employees which is referred to in § 11 so
request, an employer shall also, in a case other than those mentioned
therein, negotiate with that organisation before he makes or implements a
decision which concerns a member of the organisation. If special reasons
so necessitate, however, the employer may make and implement the deci-
sion before he has fulfilled his duty to negotiate.
MBL § 12, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 236.
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ations before making an "important alteration to his activity" or any
important alteration of working or employment conditions for employ-
ees." 102 These words were intended to reach those decisions that "one
would typically expect a union to wish to have an opportunity to nego-
tiate about,"1 °3 including decisions concerning the opening of new
plants, closing of existing plants, reducing operations, changing the lo-
cation of the enterprise or parts of the firm, and other major investment
decisions. 10 '
The Labor Court has given added content to the words, holding
that there is a duty to negotiate before deciding to introduce a new type
of machinery,105 move control of a plant from one subsidiary to an-
other,10 6 sell the company,107 or hire a new managing director,108 pro-
duction chief,109 administrative head, or foreman.110 In the United
States these would be considered decisions concerning "the scope and
direction of the enterprise" ' or reaching "the core of entrepreneurial
control,'112 decisions in which the employees would be entitled to no
voice. They could be decided unilaterally by the employer without any
notice to the union, the union could not insist on discussing these sub-
jects, and employees would have no right to strike or take other eco-
nomic action in protest against the employer's decision or the em-
ployer's refusal to discuss his decision. 1
This comparison of the legal duty to negotiate does not give a full
picture of either the potential or actual scope of participation. In the
United States the union and employer are free to negotiate on almost
any subject they mutually agree is negotiable, 114 as long as it does not
encroach on the rights of third parties or violate the law. Thus the
potential scope of participation is substantially as broad as in Sweden.
The employer, however, can refuse to discuss so-called permissive or
nonmandatory subjects, and the union cannot strike to compel the em-
ployer either to discuss such subjects or to agree about them. 15 In prac-
102 MBL § 11, translated in F. ScHmiDT, supra note 4, at 235.
103 Prop. 1975/76105, bil. 1, at 353.
104 Id. at 354; AD 1978:29, 51, 110 (government report).
105 See AD 1980:63 (labor court report).
106 See AD 1979:1 (labor court report).
107 See AD 1980:49, 81 (labor court report).
108 See AD 1980:72; AD 1981:8 (labor court report).
109 See AD 1979:118 (labor court report).
110 See AD 1980:163; AD 1981:13 (labor court report).
111 First Nat'I Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981).
112 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
113 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
114 Id.
115 Id.
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tice most employers will not negotiate on subjects beyond those that are
legally required.
The scope of participation in the United States, in fact, usually
does not encompass all of the required subjects of bargaining, for the
employer can negotiate for a provision in the collective agreement that
certain matters be within his unilateral control during the contract
term.11 6 This "management prerogatives clause" may, for example,
give the employer the right to change work schedules, determine job
duties, transfer employees, or contract out work-all without notice or
discussion with the unions. Not only can the employer negotiate for
such a clause, but he can refuse to sign an agreement or lock out his
employees until the union agrees.17
Swedish employers are similarly permitted to use their bargaining
power to reduce the required scope of negotiations. Under section 4 of
the Codetermination Act, the Employer's Confederation or one of its
member associations could demand a provision in a collective agreement
that would shrink the duty to negotiate and reinstitute, in whole or in
part, the employer's right to direct and assign the work. This demand
could be supported by a lockout.
The practical situation in the two countries, however, is quite dif-
ferent. The Employer's Confederation would not seek, and the unions
could not accept, any agreement that substantially reduced the rights of
codetermination established by the statute. In the United States, by way
of contrast, almost every agreement has a management prerogatives
clause that gives the employer unilateral control over negotiable sub-
jects. Although management's reserved rights during the contract term
are rarely as broad as the earlier paragraph 32 clauses in Swedish
agreements, the scope of participation is substantially narrowed to cover
an area smaller than the legally required subjects of bargaining.
An essential element of the right to participation in the decisions
of the enterprise is the right to receive information relevant to those
decisions. The scope of this right is much broader in Sweden than in
the United States. First, the Swedish statute requires the employer to
take the initiative in regularly providing the union with relevant infor-
mation. "' The American employer has no such affirmative obligation
but is required to produce information only when the union specifically
requests it."'
1I8 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1952).
1'7 See id.
118 MBL § 19, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 237.
119 See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Kroger Co. v. NLRB,
399 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co., 331 F.2d 209
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Second, in the United States the right of unions to information is
limited to that relevant for bargaining. 2 Because the subjects on which
bargaining is required are limited, the scope of information to which
the union is entitled is thereby circumscribed. In Sweden the unlimited
scope of bargaining precludes any such circumscription.
Third, unions in the United States are not entitled even to all in-
formation that they reasonably believe necessary for bargaining. They
are entitled to a wider range of personnel information, such as the
wage rates and earnings of each employee; the number of employees of
each employer; the number of employees in each classification; and data
regarding merit increases, promotions, hirings, layoffs and the costs of
holidays, vacations, pensions, and other benefits. 2 ' However, unions
are almost never entitled to information concerning the general business
activities of the enterprise, its productivity, profitability,' 22 competitive
position, financial plans, or market prospects, even though this infor-
mation might be crucial to the union in developing its bargaining poli-
cies on wages and other terms or conditions of employment.' 23 In Swe-
den the union is entitled to all relevant information, including the
salaries of executives and other employees not covered by the collective
agreement, unit costs of production, the number of units produced, the
sales price, and the profit margin. The union is entitled to examine the
books and accounts to verify this information. In addition, the employer
must inform the union of plans for expansion, contraction, the intro-
duction of new products, or other changes in the activities of the enter-
prise. The right to participate in all decisions of the enterprise that
affect the employees' welfare and interests is matched by the right to
have full information concerning the activities and plans of the
enterprise."'
How can we explain these marked differences between the two
(7th Cir. 1964).
120 Bartosic & Hartley, The Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the
Union-A Study of the Interplay of Administrative and Judicial Rationalization, 58
CORNELL L. REv. 23 (1972).
121 See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 411 (1976) (presumption
under the NLRA that a wide variety of wage and *fringe benefit information is relevant
and must be disclosed by the employer).
122 However, if the employer, during negotiations, claims that it cannot meet the
union's demands because of its financial condition, it may be required to provide the
financial information to show that this is true. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149, 153-54 (1956).
122 Shedlin, Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the
Impact on the American System of Labor-Management Relations, 41 OHIO ST. L.J.
441 (1980).
124 F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 115-19; Prop. 1975/76:105, at 231-39 (govern-
ment report).
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countries in the scope of subjects about which the employer is required
to negotiate and in the scope of information that the employer is re-
quired to provide? In my view two interrelated factors have contributed
to the difference. First, in the United States the duty to bargain and the
right to strike have been viewed as opposite sides of the same coin. If a
matter is a mandatory subject of bargaining, then the union can legally
strike concerning that matter; if the matter is not a mandatory subject
of bargaining, then the union cannot legally strike. 25 A determination
that the employer is not required to bargain on a particular subject
expresses a judgment that the employer should be able to make deci-
sions on that subject free from economic pressure by the union. The
premise is that certain decisions of management should be legally
shielded from union economic action-a premise historically accepted
by American courts in limiting the objectives for which a union could
legally strike.12 Sweden never developed any such legal limits on the
objects for which a union could strike. There was little need, for the
Employers Confederation, achieved by agreement in the December
Compromise of 1906, imposed limits much narrower than those since
imposed by American law.
The second and more fundamental reason for the difference in the
scope of participation in the two countries is that the National Labor
Relations Act and Swedish Codetermination Act are built on quite dif-
ferent premises. The National Labor Relations Act conceives of collec-
tive bargaining and the relation of the union and the employer as pre-
dominately one of confrontation. According to the Supreme Court in
First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 27 "Congress had no ex-
pectation that the elected union representative would become an equal
partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the union's
members are employed."
To maintain the adversarial structure and to keep the opposing
parties in balance, the law must shield the employer's "core of en-
trepreneurial control"1 2 " from participation by the union. In holding
that an employer need not negotiate before deciding to close down a
12 See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
12 Haverhill Strand Theatre, Inc. v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E. 671 (1918)
(requiring hiring of more musicians than desired); DeMinico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593,
94 N.E. 317 (1911) (requiring discharge of a foreman); Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass.
294, 84 N.E. 457 (1908) (requiring employer to follow union rules); Opera on Tour,
Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E.2d 349, cert. denied, 314 U.S. 615 (1941)
(preventing use of technological devices); Welinsky v. Hillman, 185 N.Y.S. 257 (Sup.
Ct. 1920) (preventing employer from closing a department).
127 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981).
"' Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
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part of his operations, the Court said that the "employer's need for
unencumbered decisionmaking" must be weighed against "the benefit,
for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining pro-
cess,"'1 29 and concluded, "[T]he harm likely to be done to an employer's
need to operate freely in deciding to shut down part of its business
purely for economic reasons outweighs the incremental benefits that
might be gained through the union's participation in making the
decision."' 30
The Supreme Court views employees and the union not as part-
ners,.but as antagonists of the employer with separate and conflicting
interests. Indeed, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 3' the. Court declared
that faculty members who had a voice in university decisions should be
excluded from collective bargaining because the employer was entitled
to the "undivided loyalty"' 2 of those who participated in management
decisions. Collective bargaining was only for adversaries of manage-
ment; it was not a process for participation in management.
The Swedish Codetermination Act, in contrast, stands on the pre-
mise that management and the employees are partners in the enterprise
and that the employees are entitled to participate in decision-making.
The employees, as full partners, are entitled to full knowledge of all
aspects of the business and to a voice in all of its activities.' The
statutory repudiation of paragraph 32 left no shielded area of manage-
ment prerogatives, and the decision-making process is to be one not of
confrontation, but of codetermination. This view of the role of employ-
ees, speaking through the union, leads to the nearly unlimited scope of
participation and information in Swedish law.
The premise of codetermination by employees and employers was
laid down in the first legislation on worker participation in the early
1970's-the Act on Board Representation for Employees of Joint Stock
Companies and Cooperative Associations of 1972,' 34-which gave em-
ployees the right to elect two members to sit on the board. Explicit
recognition was thereby given to the principle that employees were to
be partners in the enterprise, entitled to a voice in all decisions of the
enterprise. As stated by LO in proposing such legislation, "Representa-
tion on the Board would serve to indicate that workers are part of the
firm and that they have a right to give their views on its activities
1" First Nat'l Maintenance, 454 U.S. at 679.
SO Id. at 686.
211 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
182 Id. at 682.
113 See R. FAHLBECK, supra note 101, at 43-45.
ae" The Act expired in June 1976 and has been replaced by the Act of the same
name of 1976. See F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 85.
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before any final decisions are taken."" 5 In disposing of the argument
that board membership would create dual loyalties, LO declared, "It is
quite incorrect to regard the workers' interests as being opposed to the
firm's. In fact, the workers are part of the firm, so they cannot be at
variance with it." ' 6
In the United States there has not been even serious consideration
of providing by law for employee representation on corporate boards.
The rare examples of such representation.. are overshadowed by the
explicit declarations of leading union officers that it is inconsistent with
the union's collective bargaining function."' The dominant view of
both unions and employers has been that they are adversaries and that
collective bargaining is a process of confrontation. The premise of part-
nership and joint interest in the enterprise has been largely rejected,
with the result that the scope of employee participation has not encom-
passed many management decisions in which the employees have a vital
interest. The Swedish statute, by contrast, is built on the premise that
employees are partners in the enterprise and are therefore entitled to a
voice in all decisions that affect their interests.
135 LO, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY, PROGRAMME ADOPTED BY THE 1971 LO
CONGRESS 107.
"I8 Id. Representation has provided employees with relatively little influence over
decisions, but it has given them a better opportunity to observe and understand the
operation of the enterprise and its problems. SIND 1975:4, UTREDNING FRAN
STATENS INDUSTRIVERK, STYRELSE REPRESENTATION F6R ANSTXLLDA, EN-
FARENHETER FRAN F6RSOKSPERIODEN 257 (1975).
M The most noted example is the election of the president of the auto workers to
the board of Chrysler. Three special elements are worthy of note: (1) he was elected by
the members of the board, not the union; (2) he is the only employee member on a
large board; and (3) his election was motivated primarily by the need to get the support
and cooperation of the union in obtaining large government loans to keep the company
from bankruptcy. See N.Y. Times, May 14, 1980, at D1, col. 3.
There has been discussion of having a union officer on the corporate boards of
Ford and General Motors as part of an agreement by the union to reduce wages and
benefits, but these proposals have neither been pressed by the union nor accepted by the
companies.
13" The president of the AFL-CIO (then secretary-treasurer) stated the union's
opposition to workers becoming partners in these blunt terms: "[The American worker]
is smart enough to know, in his bones, that salvation lies-not in the reshuffling of
chairs in the board room or in the executive suite-but in the growing strength and
bargaining power of his own autonomous organizations." Ellenberger, The Realities of
Co-Determination, AFL-CIO AM. FEDERATIONIST, Oct. 1977, at 15 (statement of
Lane Kirkland). This view was echoed by the president of the Machinists union, who
declared, "We have no interest in replacing free enterprise with a more utopian system
.... And we believe workers can receive a better share of the fruits of free enterprise
at bargaining tables than in board rooms." Id. (statement of William W. Winpisinger).
Within the last two years there has been some softening of this opposition, but there is
still no general support for employee membership on corporate boards.
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B. The Effectiveness of Participation
To measure employee participation in the two countries, it is nec-
essary to compare not only the scope of subjects in which employees
have a voice, but also the effectiveness of their voice in influencing deci-
sions on such subjects. To what extent are the decisions different than
they would have been if there had been no participation?
To make this comparison, it is necessary to discuss separately
those decisions concerning wages and other economic terms-the tradi-
tional subjects of collective agreements in Sweden-and those decisions
concerning direction of the work and management of the enter-
prise-the area newly embraced by the Codetermination Act. Both the
method and the character of participation in these two areas are quite
different in the two countries. Economic and noneconomic subjects are
handled quite separately in Sweden, whereas they are almost com-
pletely merged in the United States.
1. Wages and Economic Terms
In both Sweden and the United States, disputes over wages and
other economic terms may be resolved by economic conflict. In principle
the effectiveness of the employees' voice ultimately depends on the ef-
fectiveness of the strike and lockout.
In the United States the union's economic strength varies widely
from industry to industry and from employer to employer. The Auto
Workers union can completely close down General Motors, which then
sees its potential customers buying Fords or Volkswagens. The Steel-
workers union can close down the steel industry, which then is pres-
sured by the automobile companies and other users of steel to settle.
The Teamsters union can paralyze trucking, and all shippers become
willing to accept an increase in freight rates. On the other hand, a
strike called by a union of hotel workers may be observed by only half
of the employees, and the hotel will remain open or the customers will
go to another hotel. A strike by garment workers may only drive busi-
ness to nonunion plants or to imports; a strike by textile workers can be
suicidal because the strikers' jobs may be taken by strikebreakers. Thus
the effectiveness of participation in unionized industries and enterprises
ranges from a very high level to a level that borders on total ineffective-
ness. One result of this difference in effectiveness is a great disparity in
wages and other benefits within unionized as well as nonunionized
industries.1"9
..9 One union leader has described the result as a "two-tier labor force," with
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In Sweden the strike is a potentially powerful weapon in every
industry since the unions can effectively close down any or all establish-
ments. But the lockout is an equally powerful weapon to counteract the
strike. More important, centralization of negotiations, centralized con-
trol of the strike and lockout, and the use of sympathetic economic ac-
tion largely preclude open economic conflict. The national organiza-
tions refuse to sanction or support strikes or lockouts in specific
enterprises, for they will almost inevitably spread by sympathetic action
to the entire industry. A strike called in one industry will be countered
by a lockout in related industries, which will in turn be countered by
strikes in still other industries. The legality of and willingness to use
sympathetic action means that a limited action can expand in ever
widening circles until almost the entire private and public sectors are
brought to a standstill.
This prospect of this happening is always present, and it occurred
in 1980 when successive calls for sympathetic strikes and lockouts
spread a dispute until the whole Swedish economy and most public
services were closed down for a week.'40 As this experience dramati-
cally demonstrated, the strike and lockout are equally powerful, so as to
be weapons of mutual destruction that neither party can afford to use.
They contribute to a system of mutual deterrence that puts heavy pres-
sure on both parties to resolve their problems by negotiation rather
than by economic conflict."" Those negotiations, as was suggested ear-
lier, must be linked with governmental decisions on social benefits and
taxes that can add to or subtract from the wages negotiated in the cen-
tral agreement.
The effectiveness of the employees' ,oice in determining their
wages and economic terms in Sweden is thus ultimately measured by
the unions' ability to influence, in conjunction with central negotiations,
the national economic policy. This depends less on the effectiveness of
the strike than on the political and economic climate for making" that
policy.
In general terms it is impossible to compare the effectiveness of the
employees' voice in determining wages and other economic terms in the
two countries. What can be said is that in the United States effective-
ness depends more on the union's ability to strike, whereas in Sweden
high-wage unions and low-wage unions. S. CHAIKEN, A LABOR VIEWPOINT: AN-
OTHER OPINION 115-21 (1980).
140 See generally STORKONFLIKTEN 1980 (A. Brostrim ed. 1981).
141 There is always, in the background, the possibility of government intervention
by legislation. During the 1971 strike by SACO and SR, legislation was passed to
impose a continuation of the collective agreements, thereby subjecting the parties to the
peace obligation and ending the strike. See F. Schmidt, supra note 4, at 196.
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effectiveness depends more on the union's political strength and the po-
litical and economic context. In Sweden the voices of all employees are
relatively equal, with the voice of low-wage groups given priority. In
the United States employees in strong unions have strong voices, em-
ployees in weak unions have weak voices, and seventy percent of the
employees have no voice at all. The low-wage groups are among those
who have a weak voice or who are entirely voiceless.
2. Noneconomic Terms
Comparing the effectiveness of participation in matters beyond
wages and other economic terms in these two countries is much more
complicated. Although many of the legal rules are remarkably similar,
differences in the character of the collective agreement and the accepted
method of dealing with these matters lead to quite different results. A
brief analytical sketch of the collective bargaining process through
which employees participate in in the United States will provide a basis
for comparison.
To analyze the participation process in the United States, it is nec-
essary to distinguish between the process before a collective agreement
is made and the process after it is made. Prior to making a collective
agreement, an employer cannot make any change in any mandatory
subjects of bargaining without first bargaining with the majority
union.142 The employer is responsible for initiating negotiations, and he
must bargain in good faith to impasse-until it appears that further
negotiation would be fruitless-before he can make the change.
This duty not to make unilateral changes without first bargaining
to impasse parallels the primary duty to negotiate created by section 11
of the Swedish Codetermination Act. In both countries this duty makes
the employees' voice more effective because it enables them to have
their say before the decision is made. In both countries the union may
legally strike to influence that decision. The rule in Sweden has a
broader impact because, as pointed out earlier, it reaches many man-
agement decisions that are far beyond the scope of mandatory subjects
in the United States.
1 43
Negotiations leading up to the collective agreement in the United
States customarily involve a wide range of subjects beyond wages and
other economic terms and potentially include all mandatory subjects of
bargaining. The purpose of the negotiations is to establish substantive
142 NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962); NLRB v. Crompton-Highland
Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217, 225 (1949).
143 See supra text accompanying notes 80-115.
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rules to govern those matters during the contract term. The negotiations
may, for example, prescribe detailed seniority rules governing the order
of layoffs and rehires, establish standards to determine who shall be
promoted to better jobs, state the circumstances under which employees
may be transferred, regulate who shall perform overtime work, and fix
the number of employees to be used on certain operations. All of these
rules or standards are negotiated along with wages and other economic
terms as a single package, and, if the parties are unable to agree on a
package, the union may strike or the employer may lockout.14  The
employees' voice on all of these noneconomic terms is heard in the same
way and with the same effectiveness as their voice on wages.
After the collective agreement is made, the situation is significantly
changed, for the employer is now legally bound by the substantive rules
of the collective agreement. If economic conditions require a layoff, the
employer need not discuss with the union who should be laid off, for
the collective agreement controls. If he does not follow the seniority
rules prescribed by the collective agreements, he is liable for breach of
contract. The employer need not discuss with the union before he
makes a promotion; but if the union believes that he has not properly
applied the contractual standard, it can file a grievance and obtain an
adjudication on that issue.1 45 If the collective agreement provides that
five men are required to operate a machine, the employer cannot, either
before or after negotiations, assign four men, at least without the con-
sent of the union. The employer's primary obligation during the con-
tract term is to act in accordance with the collective agreement; he has
at most a limited obligation to discuss additions to or changes in the
rules established by the agreement. 46
It is important to emphasize that not all of the limitations on the
144 See Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979); Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp.,
356 U.S. 342 (1958); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
145 Whether an employer has violated the collective agreement is usually deter-
mined by an arbitrator, for over 90% of collective bargaining agreements provide that
disputes as to interpretation and application of the agreement shall be submitted to
arbitration. C. SUMMERS, H. WELLINGTON & A. HYDE, LABOR LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 761 (1982). The arbitrator can determine what remedy is appropriate, but
he cannot normally impose a penalty.
146 The scope of the employer's legal duty to bargain during the contract term is
highly uncertain. There seems to be no duty to bargain over matters discussed and
agreed upon during negotiation of the agreement but not included in the written agree-
ment, Nelson & Howard, The Duty to Bargain During the Term of an Existing Con-
tract, 27 LAB. L.J. 573, 583 (1976), but there is a duty to bargain on matters neither
discussed during negotiations nor embodied in the terms of the agreement, Jacobs Mfg.
Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1219 (1951), affd sub nom. NLRB v. Jacobs Mfg. Co., 196
F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952).
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employer are necessarily found in the words of the agreement. There
may be many silent or implied terms based on surrounding circum-
stances or the assumed understanding of the parties. One of the main
sources of silent or implied terms is past practices. If in the past the
employer has allowed employees five minutes working time to wash up
before going home, a court or arbitrator may find that he is contractu-
ally bound to continue that practice even though no mention is made of
it in the agreement. The job duties of a particular position may be
defined by past practice without any contractual language, and whether
an employer may contract out work may depend on whether he has
contracted out such work in the past. 47
On the other side the employer is generally free to act as long as
he stays within the express and implied rules laid down by the agree-
ment, and he can usually act without first negotiating with the union.
Although the National Labor Relations Board has intermittently held
that an employer must bargain before making any changes unless there
is a waiver by the union, 4" the dominant view of the collective agree-
ment is that it settles all potentially negotiable matters and frees the
employer of the duty to negotiate about them during the contract
term. 49 To the extent that the agreement does not expressly or im-
pliedly limit his freedom to act, it gives him full freedom to act unilat-
erally. This is commonly articulated in the management prerogatives
clause and is reinforced by so-called "waiver" or "zipper"' 50 clauses.
In the United States the collective agreement carries with it no
statutory peace obligation as it does in Sweden, but most collective
147 See Mittenthal, Past Practice and the Administration of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 59 MIcH. L. REv. 1017, 1030-40 (1961); Wallen, The Silent Contract vs.
Express Provisions: The Arbitration of Local Working Conditions, 15 NAT'L ACAD.
ARB. 117, 123-34 (1962).
148 See, e.g., Western Mass. Elec. Co., 228 N.L.R.B. 607 (1977), enforced as
modified sub nora. Western Mass. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 573 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1978).
But see McDonnell Douglas Corp., 224 N.L.R.B. 881, 895-96 (1976).
149 See generally Cox & Dunlop, The Duty to Bargain Collectively During the
Term of an Existing Agreement, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1097 (1950); Mittenthal, The Role
of Law in Arbitration, 21 NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 42-58 (1968).
150 These clauses, which may be worded in various ways, generally state that all
terms and conditions of employment have been settled and agreed upon by the collective
agreement and that the union waives any right to bargain during the term of the con-
tract about terms not expressly included in the agreement. The legal effect of these
clauses is uncertain because of contradictory decisions by the NLRB. See, e.g., Pepsi-
Cola Distrib. Co., 241 N.L.R.B. 869, 870 (1979) (presence of zipper clause did not
preclude implying continued right to bonus), affd sub nom. NLRB v. Pepsi-Cola Dis-
trib. Co., 646 F.2d 1173 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1993 (1982);
Radioear Corp., 214 N.L.R.B. 362, 363-64 (1974) (presence of zipper clause did pre-
clude implying continued right to bonus); Bancroft-Whitney Co., 214 N.L.R.B. 57, 57-
58 (1974) (presence of zipper clause did preclude implying right to bargain for wage
dividend).
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agreements include a no-strike clause. If the employer takes unilateral
action that does not violate the agreement, the union is barred by the
no-strike clause from trying to influence that decision. The parties can,
and sometimes do, limit the no-strike clause so that the union can strike
on certain matters during the contract term. For example, collective
agreements in the auto industry do not fix the speed of the assembly
line, but contemplate that changes in the speed are to be negotiated,
and if no agreement is reached, the union can strike. Such provisions,
however, are exceptional.
The Board's decisions, to the extent that they impose a duty to
bargain during the contract term, parallel sections 11 and 13 of the
Codetermination Act in that they limit the employer's freedom to make
changes in existing employment conditions. Again, the duty in the
United States is much narrower because it extends only to mandatory
subjects.
Many of the legal rules relating to the duty to bargain in Sweden
so closely parallel those in the United States that if the structure of
collective agreements and the scope of mandatory subjects were the
same, the results would be substantially equivalent. There are, how-
ever, two basic structural differences between the two countries. First,
in Sweden negotiation of wages and other economic terms is not merged
with negotiations on other matters embraced by the Codetermination
Act, and no single agreement is made encompassing all matters on
which there is a duty to negotiate. Collective agreements on wages and
other economic terms have substantially the same form and narrow
scope now as they had prior to the passage of the Act. Other matters,
previously reserved to management by paragraph 32 clauses but not
required subjects for negotiation under the statute, are meant to be cov-
ered by separate codetermination agreements. The separation is sym-
bolized by the fact that not until 1982, six years after the statute was
enacted, was any central codetermination agreement negotiated with the
Swedish Employers Confederation, which represents the major part of
the private sector, although three central wage agreements had been
negotiated in the meantime.1 51 Even then, the codetermination agree-
ment was only a preliminary or partial agreement contemplating fur-
ther negotiations.152
The second, and most critical structural difference is that
codetermination agreements are conceived as procedural, not substan-
151 For the text of these wage agreements, see MBA-S (covering state sector em-
ployees), 1978; MBA-B (covering bank sector employees), 1979; MBA-KL (covering
local and provincial sector employees), June, 1980.
'5 Utvecklingsavtal SAF-LO/PTK, April 4, 1982.
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tive, agreements. The agreements thus far negotiated, including the
ones for the public sectors and for the banks and cooperatives, have few
if any substantive rules or standards governing the employer's decisions.
Instead, the agreements provide organizational structures and proce-
dures to be followed by the parties in negotiating the substantive mat-
ters within their scope at the plant or enterprise levels. Indeed, propos-
als going beyond procedure to substance were not even seriously
considered in the negotiations leading up to these central agreements.15 3
The fact that these central joint regulation agreements are proce-
dural rather than substantive is quite understandable. Unlike the more
localized American agreements, they cover an extremely wide variety of
situations. Designing substantive rules suitable for all those not covered
would be impractical, if not impossible. Locally negotiated solutions are
more appropriate. In addition the subjects covered include many mat-
ters with which collective agreements in the United States do not deal
and which may not be suitable for regulation by substantive rules. For
example, it would be difficult to design substantive rules applicable to
the selection of a managing director, change of product design, or the
decision to open a new plant. Although the American experience sug-
gests that at least a certain range of decisions can be regulated by sub-
stantive rules at the local level, in Sweden there seems to be no intent
or desire to do so.
Although the central codetermination agreements provide for sup-
plementary local agreements, the contemplation seems to be that these
too will be primarily procedural with few substantive rules or veto
rights. What is contemplated is not participation through rules estab-
lished in advance to govern future cases but negotiation of each case as
it arises. The lack of rules does not necessarily mean less participation
in the result but may mean only a more flexible problem-solving
process.
The most striking characteristic of Swedish negotiations in this
area, from an American point of view, is the unwillingness of Swedish
unions to use the strike to restrict the employer's ultimate right to de-
cide codetermination issues. The unions have not coupled negotiation of
a codetermination agreement with negotiation of a wage agreement in
order to use the threat of economic action on the two together. Section
44 of the Codetermination Act provides that the union, at the time of.
"I The first proposal by the, unions for a central codetermination agreement in-
cluded a number of matters on which the union would have a power of decision, either
in the form of deciding the matter in the first instance or having a veto right over the
employer's decision. However, by the time of the union proposal of November 30,
1979, these matters had been dropped.
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making a wage agreement, can reserve the right to strike on
codetermination issues free from the statutory peace obligation, al-
lowing the union to strike on those issues separately during the contract
term. The unions, however, have never asserted or used this surviving
right to strike, even in the face of their inability over a period of five
years to obtain a central codetermination agreement with the Employ-
ers Confederation. More important in the long run, the codetermina-
tion system as it is now being developed seems to contemplate that the
unions' economic strength will not be used to influence the employers'
decisions. Except for the unions' limited right to veto subcontracting
under section 38, the employer will retain the right of final decision.
The effectiveness of the employee's participation will be limited to the
employer's willingness to listen and be persuaded.
In sharp contrast American unions regularly use the strike to in-
fluence the employer's decision on such matters. Wage issues and
noneconomic issues are merged in negotiation; a strike will commonly
involve both types of issues, and settlement of the strike may require
employer concessions on both. Moreover, American unions are quite
prepared to strike on noneconomic management prerogative issues. In-
deed, such an issue is often the major issue and at times is the only
issue.
The marked unwillingness of Swedish unions to use their eco-
nomic strength to obtain codetermination agreements or influence deci-
sions in this area invites speculation as to the reason. Perhaps the prin-
cipal reason is that the unions have historically placed increased wages
first and limitations on the employers' prerogatives last. 15 In spite of
the unions' emphatically stated demands for industrial democracy, the
unions have not considered striking over it, particularly when the strike
might lead to a nationwide shutdown. In addition, underneath there
may be an intuitive sense, developed from seventy years of acceptance
of paragraph 32, that the strike is not an appropriate instrument for
asserting a share in the decisions of the enterprise. Such sharing should
not be achieved or exercised by economic force, but by legislation or
154 See B. SCHILLER, supra note 43, at 79-80. Schiller states that those at the LO
secretariat who worked with the enterprise democracy questions saw them as large and
important questions, but "they were at the same time aware that compared with the
wage questions they had low status in many persons' eyes. In a rank ordering of wages,
work safety, job security and enterprise democracy, wages placed first and enterprise
democracy last." Id. at 114. For a statement by the chairman of Svenska
Industritjgnstemannafiirbundet (SIF) that the members of the union were not prepared
to strike to obtain a joint regulation agreement, see TCO, KLARTEXT OM MEDBESTXM-
MANDE: FRAN EN TCO-KONFERENS PA FORESTA 31 AUGUSTI 1981, at 17.
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negotiation.155
We might conclude from the preceding discussion that the effec-
tiveness of the employees' voice in influencing decisions on
codetermination issues is much greater in the United States than in
Sweden. In the United States, where collective bargaining exists, work-
ers make their voice heard through persuasion backed by economic ac-
tion; in Sweden, workers make their voice heard through persuasion
alone. This bald description, however, may be misleading, for it ignores
the willingness of employers in Sweden to listen to and accept the em-
ployees as partners in the enterprise. There is evidence that at least
some Swedish employers, particularly larger ones, do not need the club
of a strike to induce them to listen and give substantial weight to the
employees' views in reaching decisions. Without any use of the strike or
the threat of strike, a substantial number of codetermination agree-
ments have been achieved in many enterprises since the passage of the
statute.' The acceptance of unions and collective bargaining as a legit-
imate and essential part of society may give more reality to worker
participation through persuasion in Sweden than is achieved through
confrontation and strikes in the United States.
Because employees do not have enough votes to influence the out-
come of management board decisions, employee representation on
boards again provides employees with an opportunity to participate
only through persuasion. Persuasion here has proven to be of limited
effectiveness, and the primary value of board representation has been to
provide the union with insight into the problems of the enterprise and
"5 Prior to negotiating the modification of the Basic Agreement in 1964-limiting
the employer's right to discharge- LO stated that if negotiations with SAF did not
give results, legislation would be necessary. B. ScHiLLER, supra note 43, at 76-77. In
1969, when there was a proposal that paragraph 32 be taken up in the contract negoti-
ations, the LO representative body rejected it. See id. at 96.
'" Many research projects are trying to measure the effectiveness of the MBL in
its practical operation. Many of these are unpublished and some are ongoing. The
conclusions drawn are hopelessly conflicting, depending on the enterprises studied and
the standard against which success is to be measured. In some cases the outcome seems
predetermined by the character of the inquiry or the predisposition of those doing the
research.
My net impression is that the process of consultation is working reasonably well in
many larger enterprises and that the flow of information is quite substantial, even
flooding the workplace representatives in some instances. In smaller enterprises the
process is very uneven. It should be noted that when the statute became effective all the
existing agreements on works councils and other forms of cooperation were terminated
and local joint regulation agreements were barred, pending negotiation of a central joint
regulation agreement with SAF, which was not reached until 1982. For five years joint
regulation in all areas of the private sector, save banks and cooperatives, developed in
this vacuum. The experience during this period was scarcely a fair measure of the
potential effectiveness of the process after a central agreement was reached.
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with added information concerning its plans and activities. 5 ' This has
allowed the union to increase its effectiveness in negotiations at the
workplace under the Codetermination Act.
A separate and more effective avenue for participation in Sweden
exists for matters concerning safety, health, and other elements of the
working environment. Chapter 6 of the Work Environment Act of 1977
requires the naming of safety representatives in all work places of five
or more employees and safety committees in workplaces of fifty or more
employees. The safety representatives or committees have rights paral-
lel to those of union representatives under the Codetermination Act: the
right to participate in planning, the right to be notified before signifi-
cant changes are to be made, and the right to all relevant information.
They have, in addition, certain powers of decision. Where there is im-
mediate and serious danger to life or health, they can order the suspen-
sion of work pending a decision by the Labor Inspectorate. The Cen-
tral Working Environment Agreement15 between the employer and
union confederations provides for joint safety committees, with em-
ployee representatives having the majority. This agreement has given
employees greatly expanded decision-making powers in safety matters,
including the approval of company doctors and safety engineers. In the
United States no equivalent employee participation in safety matters is
provided by law. Participation is through collective bargaining only,
and, except in mining and the chemical industry, unions have made
only limited efforts to include safety rules in their collective
agreements.1 59
C. Participation by Employees in Employee Representation
Participation by employees cannot be direct, except in matters af-
fecting single workers or small groups. Participation must be through
representatives, and in both Sweden and the United States that repre-
sentative is the union. Measuring employee participation in decisions of
the enterprise requires measuring employee participation in decisions of
the union that represents them. Industrial democracy requires union
democracy. We must therefore attempt to compare how much voice
union members in Sweden and the United States have in the decisions
of their unions.
To make this comparison it is again necessary to treat separately
I"' See supra note 137.
158 See F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 150.
159 For some possible explanations why, see L. BACOW, BARGAINING FOR JOB
SAFETY AND HEALTH 88-102 (1980).
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decisions concerning basic economic terms and decisions concerning
other matters because, as the preceding section has pointed out,""0 in
Sweden these decisions are made by quite different processes and at
different organizational levels.
Centralization of collective agreements in Sweden has removed de-
cision-making so far from the union members that they have no effec-
tive voice in deciding the contents of the central agreement or even the
national industry agreements that implement the central agreement.
Members can only delegate to union officials three or four levels re-
moved from them the authority to do what those officials believe is best.
The members have no effective control through the election of those
officials because they are selected through a multilayered union dele-
gate structure that deadens any voice of disagreement. Their elections
are seldom contested, and the principal officers are not required to run
for re-election but are elected for indefinite terms-"until fur-
ther"-usually serving until retirement.61 Some unions have attempted
to bridge this chasm between the members and those doing the negoti-
ating by creating collective agreement conferences or advisory boards,
but these add little to the members' actual participation in the decision-
making process. At most they increase the likelihood that the decisions
will be acceptable to the members.
1 62
At one time, collective agreements were submitted to a member-
ship vote, but in 1941 the Confederation of Labor's constitution was
amended to require all national unions to provide in their statutes that
the union's executive board had the authority to conclude the contract
regardless of the vote.""3 Even though the membership vote had been
160 See supra text accompanying notes 140-60.
161 In LO and the national unions, the officers, such as the chairman, vice chair-
man, secretary, and contract secretary, are elected "until further." The representative
bodies, such as the Secretariat and Representantskapet, and national union board mem-
bers are elected by the congress for the congress period.
18" Professor Lewin concludes, on the basis of answers to questionnaires, that the
union leaders' opinions are representative of the members' opinions. He attributes this,
in part, to the ability of the leaders to shape the members' opinions through active
agitation and schooling and to some lack of respect for minority members' views. See L.
LEWIN, GOVERNING TRADE UNIONS IN SWEDEN 151-58 (1980).
Some of Professor Lewin's data indicate that there may be differences of opinion
between the members and the leaders on such issues as wage and price freezes, id. at
98-99 table 3.37, and collective affiliation, id. at 85, 89 table 3.26. A majority of mem-
bers said one could justifiably accuse the steering committee of the national union and
the top officials of LO of bossism, id. at 88 table 3.25, and that representatives are too
influential compared with ordinary members, id. at 89 table 3.26.
113 See J. WESTERSTAHL, supra note 40, at 97. In most unions rejection of an
agreement required a two-thirds vote of all those involved. Because many members did
not vote, the officers were almost always able to sign the agreement even though a large
majority of those voting had rejected it.
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only advisory, it was a form of participation through which the mem-
bers could voice their dissatisfaction. It continued to be used until 1955
but with the coming of central negotiations even this advisory polling
has been abandoned.1
4
The lack of membership participation in collective bargaining de-
cisions is a nearly inevitable result of the nature of negotiations at a
national level. As was pointed out earlier, centralization was itself a
product of pressures from the Employers Confederation and the nature
of the Confederation of Labor's wage policies. 6 What is largely lack-
ing is membership participation in the making of those wage policies
except through the layered delegate structure of the unions, a structure
that muffles and can distort their voice. A survey conducted in the early
1970's, for example, indicated that union members did not share the
enthusiasm of district and national officials for the policies of wage soli-
darity and rationalization,' yet it has been the district and national
officials who have made these policies and implemented them in collec-
tive agreements.
Although employees have little or no voice in determining their
wages and other economic terms at the central or industry level, they
have an effective voice at the enterprise or workplace level. Here, griev-
ances are settled, piece rates are negotiated, increases beyond those pro-
vided by the central agreement are obtained, and individual salaries for
salaried employees are determined.16 7 This is done by the union club or
other union workplace organization or by union representatives with
whom the employees have personal contact. The employees' voice at
this level is heard and is given weight.
In the United States the pattern and practice is quite different.'
This is in part because collective agreements are negotiated predomi-
nantly at the plant or enterprise level. Typically, the demands to be
made in negotiations are compiled in a local membership meeting, the
negotiating committee is made up of employees elected from the shop
floor, and when a tentative agreement is reached, it is customarily sub-
mitted to a membership vote, which is binding.'6 9 In about one out of
18 See A. HADENIUS, supra note 61, at 171-80.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
18 L. LEWIN, supra note 162, at 72-77. For a more favorable view based on
surveys made by LO, see ANDERSON, How DEMOcRATIC IS THE SWEDISH TRADE
UNION MOVEMENT? (1975).
187 See A. VICTORIN, supra note 70, at 127; S. EDLUND, supra note 71,; Trn-
blom, Medbestammandelagen dn paragraph 32 i modern skepnad, LAG & AVTAL,
Nov. 26, 1980.
188 See generally Summers, Ratification of Agreements, in FRONTIERS OF COL-
LEcTIvE BARGAINING 75-102 (1967).
189 Id. at 80-81.
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nine cases a tentative agreement is rejected, and there must be contin-
ued negotiations or a strike."' 0 Even when negotiations involve a large
number of plants or employers, there may be a high level of participa-
tion. The auto workers, before opening negotiations with General Mo-
tors, may send questionnaires to members to obtain their views or ask
each local union to make recommendations. Any agreement reached
must be approved by a vote of all union members covered by the agree-
ment. ' The steelworkers union has a wage policy committee, made up
of representatives elected from local unions, that decides on demands
and approves or disapproves settlements. 72 The Teamsters National
Master Freight Agreement is submitted to a referendum of the more
than 300,000 members covered by the agreement.
It is safe to say that the union member's voice in this country's
union decisions and policies on economic issues is much more direct and
effective in the United States than in Sweden. The same cannot be said
about noneconomic issues. As has been pointed out, the intention of the
1976 Act in Sweden was that employee representation on these issues
was to be, in the first instance, by the workplace organization, where
one existed, and otherwise by the section or local organization that usu-
ally was party to local negotiations. The union confederations have rec-
ognized that most of these decisions must be made at the local level, and
the Employers Confederation declared in its proposal for a
codetermination agreement that the decisions should be made "as near
the [involved] employee as possible.". 73 These positions have been
adopted by the codetermination agreement, which provides for a contact
representative to be appointed by the local union organizations at every
workplace. These decisions are thereby placed in the hands of repre-
sentatives who are usually elected directly by the employees, will often
be personally known to the employees, and are readily available. Al-
though little research has been done concerning the internal processes
of union clubs and other workshop organizations, these groups usually
have several meetings a year, regular and open elections, and a fre-
quent change of officers and committees, which prevents the develop-
ment of an entrenched bureaucracy. 74 This would seem to provide a
most suitable situation for employees having an effective voice.
170 1975 Lab. Rel. Y.B. (BNA) 39-40.
'71 Summers, supra note 168, at 80.
172 Id. at 79.
173 MBA § 2 (local and county governments).
174 See A. HADENIUS, supra note 61, at 163. See generally HART, RIMFORS-JON-
SSON & TEELAND, KLUBBSTYRELSEN ORGANISATION (1980). Where elections are not
contested, it seems to be due primarily to the difficulty of finding individuals willing to
serve.
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Union members in the United States may have somewhat less ef-
fective participation in the decisions of their union on these issues. Un-
ionized plants are larger and collective agreements normally cover more
employees than in Swedish workplaces, and as a result the employees'
voice may be muffled by mere size. Where the collective agreement cov-
ers a large number of plants or is with an employers association, the
employees' voice may be quite remote from the decision-making. Be-
cause all of these matters are negotiated together, along with wages,
some will get little attention and some will be traded for other benefits.
As a result, the voice of smaller groups of employees with special
problems may be ignored. In the day-to-day administration of the
agreement, the grievances of individuals or groups will be considered,
but they will be bound by the substantive rules in the collective agree-
ment. They may receive less satisfaction than if the agreement, as in
Sweden, contained no substantive rules on the matter.
The most uncertain aspect of the above comparison is that the
Codetermination Act has not yet been fully implemented and its impact
on the internal structure of Swedish unions has not been fully felt. The
comparison also assumes that the highly centralized unions will build a
decentralized structure to carry out their functions under the Act. Thus
it assumes a radical change in the unions' conception of their internal
organizational structure.175
Historically, a fundamental difference has existed between Swed-
ish and American unions' conceptions of the democratic process. The
Swedish conception has been expressed as one of representative democ-
racy, with the emphasis on the representative exercising his knowledge
and judgment on behalf of the members. The representative's responsi-
bility is not to do what they claim is best, for it is not expected that
they should tell their representative. The members do not participate in
the decisions, rather they delegate the decision-making and rely on the
representative's judgment.
American unions have relied much more on direct democracy, with
the meeting of the local union being the prime forum for decision-mak-
ing."' Referenda are commonly used to ratify contracts, call strikes,
increase dues, amend union constitutions, and elect national officers.
Representative democracy has a different meaning, for the representa-
tive is expected to follow the will of his constituents. They participate
For recognition of this needed change, see TCO, SOM VI SER DET 58-63, 124-
26, 131-36 (1981); LO, 80-RAPPORTEN: RAPPORT TILL LO-KONGRESSEN 1981, at
162 (1981).
178 Periodic elections are so fundamental that when one union president was
elected for life it was a national scandal, and he was described as "King Ryan."
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through him, as he speaks with their voice; he is their spokesman, not
their decision-maker.
Much of the rhetoric that surrounded the passage of the
Codetermination Act seemed to assume a conception of democracy
much closer to the American model of participation than the Swedish
model of representation, but there was no explicit discussion of what
form the "enterprise democracy" should take.1  Whether the unions
were aware at the time that participation at the enterprise or workplace
level required a changed conception of democracy is not clear. But there
is now a recognition that codetermination requires a decentralized
union structure with decision-making at the local level and a disavowal
of the traditional view of representation. For example, recognition of
these changes is a recurrent theme in the Report of the 1981 Confeder-
ation of Labor Congress, which declared,
So, it is not enough either to say that democracy functions if
the elected representatives reflect the electors' or the mem-
bers' views. . . Democracy functions fully first when the
sharp boundary between elector/members and elected ceases
to exist, when the whole collectivity conceives itself as par-
ticipants in the same democratic process." 8
If such declarations are given life in union structures and prac-
tices, the differences between Swedish and American unions' concep-
tions of how members are to participate in decisions of the union, par-
ticularly as to codetermination issues, will not be great.
In the United States the unions' historical commitment to demo-
cratic decision-making within the union, the traditional conception of
the form the democratic process should take, is reflected and reinformed
in legal rules. The Landrum-Griffin Act of 19591 requires unions to
177 For example, in Regeringens proposition 1975/ 76:9 it was said that the "fun-
damental idea in the committee proposal [was] that the employee should be given in-
creased possibilities to influence the conditions in working life." LO declared that "the
forms for influence must be such that one and all can become ... participant[s]." Id.
at 11. TCO placed equal emphasis on the "individual person's possibilities for influ-
encing questions which are significant for her in the workplace." Id. at 12.
178 LO, 80-RAPPORTEN: RAPPORT TILL LO-KONGRESSEN 1981, at 39 (1981).
The Report also states,
A well functioning representative democracy assumes, however, that the
member most directly involved has found some forum, for example, a club
meeting, where he can go and make his voice heard, take part, and choose
representatives, otherwise many are excluded from involvement and influ-
ence. TCO, SOM VI SER DET 126 (1981).
Id. at 128.
179 Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-
531 (1982).
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maintain certain minimum democratic standards, and these are con-
ceived and articulated as parallel to the democratic standards expected
of government, built on a participatory model.
Significantly, Title I of the Act is entitled "Bill of Rights of Mem-
bers of Labor Organizations." The first right is that "Every member
• . . shall have equal rights and privileges. . . to nominate candidates,
to vote in elections or referenda. . ., to attend membership meetings,
and to participate in the deliberations and voting upon the business of
such meetings."' 80 It has been held to be a violation of this right for
officers to refuse to allow members to raise an issue at a union meet-
ing 1' or for the officers to sign a contract after it has been voted down
by the members." 2
The second right is entitled "Freedom of Speech and Assembly,"
and it protects "the right to meet and assemble freely with other mem-
bers; and to express any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express
at meetings . . . [one's] views upon candidates in an election . . . or
upon any business properly before the meeting."' 8 This includes the
right to criticize union officers and oppose union policies. For example,
a member cannot be disciplined for claiming an officer had misused
funds, even though the accusation is not proven.' Nor can a member
be punished because he argued that members should not pay dues,' 85
attended a meeting of fellow strikers and discussed the lack of progress
in negotiating a settlement, 8 6 or advocated legislation the union op-
posed.' Debate concerning officers and policies within the union is to
be open, vigorous, and unrestrained, with members participating ac-
tively both inside and outside union meetings. By such participation,
union members are to make the decisions that affect them.
Title IV of the statute is designed to make the election of union
officers an open competition, with the election campaign serving as a
focus for debating union administration and policies. Electing for life or
"until further" is prohibited; an incumbent officer must periodically
SO Id. § 411.
181 See Parker v. Local Union No. 1466, 642 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam).
182 See Alexander v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 624 F.2d 1235 (5th
Cir. 1980).
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2).
184 Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1963).
185 Farowitz v. Associated Musicians Local 802, 330 F.2d 999, 1002 (2d Cir.
1964).
188 Kuebler v. Cleveland Lithographers and Photoengravers Union Local 24-P,
473 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1973).
18' Mitchell v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 196 Cal. App. 2d 796, 807, 16
Cal. Rptr. 813, 819-20 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
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stand for re-election.1"' Every member is guaranteed the right to make
nominations and to campaign for a candidate."8 9 Candidates have a
right to have their campaign literature distributed to all members,19 °
and no union money can be used to help elect a candidate.191 Thus the
union newspaper or magazine cannot be used to favor the incumbent
officers.
192
Again, the conception here is one of an open political contest in
which the members will actively participate and have a free choice.
Elections are often hotly contested and incumbents are defeated, partic-
ularly at the local level. Even in the national unions, incumbent officers
have been defeated in the Steelworkers, Rubber Workers, Electrical
Workers, Mine Workers, Teachers, Municipal Employees, Post Office
Employees and a number of other unions.
There is no equivalent statute in Sweden, and there are almost no
court decisions on the legal rights of union members.' 93 The reason is
quite evident-there has not been evidence of corruption, oppression, or
abuse of power by union officers such as that which provoked legisla-
tion in the United States. This is true even though the centralization of
Swedish unions, the lack of periodic elections, and the near absence of
opposition groups in the union would appear to provide greater poten-
tial for such abuses. This raises the question why there is such a differ-
ence between unions in the two countries. One important factor is that
Swedish unions have more deeply rooted traditions of political idealism
and consider themselves participants in a social movement rather than
organizations devoted to benefiting only their members' interests. Social
welfare unionism in Sweden emphasized the union leaders' social re-
sponsibility whereas "business unionism" provided a hospitable climate
for exploitation of leadership for self-aggrandizement.
IV. A CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
The most crucial contrast between Swedish and American labor
relations is the difference in underlying attitudes of employers and un-
ions toward each other. In Sweden employers and unions have histori-
cally accepted each other as social partners and viewed collective bar-
gaining as a collaborative process of developing mutually acceptable
18 29 U.S.C. § 481(a).
189 Id. § 481(e).
190 Id. § 481(c).
191 Id. § 481(g).
'92 Yablonski v. UMWA, 305 F. Supp. 868, 875, order clarified, 305 F. Supp.
876 (D.D.C. 1969).
193 See F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 45-61.
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and socially responsible solutions. In the United States unions and em-
ployers have historically viewed each other as antagonists, with employ-
ers denouncing unionization and opposing collective bargaining. Nego-
tiations, when they occur, are viewed as confrontations between hostile
forces prepared to do economic battle.
One of the correlatives of this basic difference in employer-union
relations was the difference in the unions' acceptance of management
prerogatives. Swedish employers accepted collective bargaining because
Swedish unions, through the December Compromise of 1906, accepted
paragraph 32; American employers bitterly resisted collective bargain-
ing, in part because American unions insisted on limiting the em-
ployer's freedom to manage the enterprise. Collaboration in Sweden
was possible because there was an agreement between the two parties
on what decisions were to be subject to joint control and what decisions
were to be made by management. Confrontation in the United States
was exacerbated because there was no such agreement to limit joint
control.
Enactment of the Swedish Codetermination Act in 1976 undercut
the premise on which collaboration had been based and injected into
the Swedish system an attitude of confrontation typical of the American
system. The political slogan was "Away with Paragraph 32," and,
symbolically, section 32 of the statute directly repudiated paragraph 32
by providing that "there should, if the employee party so requests, also
be concluded a collective agreement on a right of joint regulation" upon
a nearly unlimited range of management decisions."' All of these mat-
ters were opened up for collective negotiations, with ultimate resolution
to be by strike, if necessary. Section 44 of the statute even preserves a
special right to strike on these issues during the contract term. The
statute has thereby created a battleground encompassing much more
territory and reaching even more sensitive issues than identification of
mandatory subjects of bargaining in the United States.
For an American, what followed was not surprising. Negotiation
of a central codetermination agreement in the private sector came to
repeated impasses. The tone of public debate between unions and em-
ployers hardened, and what was said in private was even harsher. The
parties who had long engaged in joint labor market research could not
even agree on what research was needed or how it should be conducted.
Wage negotiations became more difficult, culminating in the great con-
flict of 1980, and fears were expressed about the future of the "Swedish
"" MBL § 32, translated in F. SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 239.
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Model. '19 5 As in the United States, the dispute over the power to make
decisions concerning management of the enterprise inflamed the whole
union-employer relationship; confrontation on managerial control gen-
erated confrontation on all issues.
This comparative perspective raises a fundamental question con-
cerning worker participation. Is it possible to have a system of collabo-
rative collective bargaining in which employers accept unions as social
partners and permit significant worker participation in the decisions of
the enterprise? Both Swedish and American experience demonstrate
that employers do not readily surrender or share the power of final
decision in managing the enterprise. Is it possible for workers to obtain
an effective voice in those decisions without creating a climate of con-
frontation in the union-management relation?
There are signs of what the Swedish solution may be, for the con-
frontation may be only temporary. The 1976 codetermination statute,
built on the historical commitment and confidence in collective negotia-
tion, has not of its own force changed the locus of power to decide. It
only requires the employer to negotiate before making decisions; after
negotiating, the employer still has the power to decide. Section 32 of
the statute calls on employers to negotiate codetermination agreements,
but it neither requires such an agreement nor requires that the agree-
ment give the union or the employees the power to decide or veto any
decision. Who should have the power to decide or veto is to be decided
by agreement after negotiation.
The statute authorizes unions to use the strike to achieve an agree-
ment, giving employees the power to decide or veto, but the unions have
not used the strike and apparently do not intend to use it. Instead, they
are prepared to settle for codetermination agreements that provide
structures and procedures for negotiation. The ultimate right to decide
will remain with the employer. With such an agreement, the inflam-
matory and divisive question of who shall decide is resolved, for it
leaves the ultimate decision-making power where it has been for sev-
enty-five years.
Such a resolution is acceptable to unions only because there is an
assumption that negotiations on these issues will not be futile ges-
tures-that employers will not exploit their power, but will shape their
decisions through negotiation with a goal of reaching agreement. The
law requires, and employers accept, that employees shall be fully in-
formed concerning the financial condition, prospects, and plans of the
... See Brostr5m, Storkonflikten 1980, in STORKONFLIKTEN 1980, supra note 41;
Eliasson, On den svenska nodellen, in STORKONFLIRTEN 1980, supra note 141, at 26-
29.
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enterprise and that employers are prepared to negotiate concerning the
full range of managerial decisions. While retaining in principle the ul-
timate right of decision, the employer accepts its employees as full so-
cial partners in the enterprise. The unions, while insisting on the right
to participate, are willing to rely on the negotiation process and the
readiness of employers to agree rather than on the use of economic
force. If unions and employers accept this definition of their relative
roles in the decision-making process, there may be a basis for collabora-
tion with participation, and the spirit of harmony and cooperation may
re-emerge in the labor market.
The Swedish solution sharpens our awareness of the obstacles to
the development of an American solution. We do not have the historical
commitment to and confidence in collective negotiations as a means of
arriving at mutually agreeable results. The deeply ingrained attitude of
confrontation, articulated as a legal doctrine, erodes any confidence of
unions or employers that the other will not press its interests to the
limits of its potential economic force.
The Wagner Act19 proclaimed a national policy of encouraging
the processes of collective bargaining, but the statute was enacted be-
cause employers did not accept such processes. Passage of the statute
did not change the dominant employer attitude; most employers con-
tinue to resist collective bargaining, and few have an affirmative com-
mitment to negotiation as a constructive process.
Unions, on the other hand, have historically insisted on participa-
tion in managerial decisions beyond those concerning wages and other
economic terms, and they have regularly used economic force to achieve
that participation. They have encountered employers who rejected par-
ticipation as an encroachment on managerial prerogatives and who
used the law to limit bargaining. American unions, products of this
past, are understandably unwilling to rely on the process of negotiation
without resort to economic force to achieve meaningful participation.
The adoption of the potential Swedish solution of participation
without confrontation in the United States is unlikely. There are some
limited sectors and scattered single employers by whom collective bar-
gaining is fully accepted and whose unions have substantial participa-
tion rights. Reaching an accommodation between employee voice and
management control is not beyond the reach of inventiveness in collec-
tive bargaining. The confrontation syndrome, however, is not likely to
shrink; on the contrary, it is likely to grow with increased efforts by
employers to eliminate union representation.
198 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
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The nearly insurmountable obstacle to achieving employee partici-
pation in the United States is that less than thirty percent of employees
are covered by collective bargaining. Extension of union representation
to any measurable portion of the other seventy percent could be
achieved only over determined employer opposition, which is likely to
produce not so much a process of negotiation toward mutually agreea-
ble results as a process of maneuvering in preparation for the outbreak
of hostilities.
There is little reason to believe that union representation will be
extended in the United States; the tide runs heavily in the other direc-
tion. If employee participation in the United States is to be achieved, it
may be necessary to supplement union representation by other forms of
employee representation. Experience in Sweden indicates that employ-
ers are more willing to accept participation by their own employees
than by union representatives from the outside. This parallels the will-
ingness of German employers to accept participation through works
councils elected by their own employees, but not through the union,
which is viewed as an outsider. This would point to our devising a
statutory system of employee representation for plants or enterprises
where collective bargaining does not exist.
The existence of obvious political obstacles to legislation that
would enable unions to extend organization or that would establish a
statutory system of employee representation leads to a final observation.
The Swedish Codetermination Act of 1976 expressed a strong public
conviction that employees should have a voice in the decisions of the
enterprise that affect their working life. It was a rejection of the sover-
eignty of management and a commitment to industrial democracy. The
United States made a similar, though not as explicit, commitment to
industrial democracy in the Wagner Act. That commitment, however,
has not been sustained; it has been largely pushed aside, ignored, and
now nearly forgotten. The Supreme Court decisions in NLRB v.
Yeshiva University197 and First National Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB... are symptomatic of current legal and social attitudes. It is fair
to say that we give little more than lip service, if that, to bringing de-
mocracy to employees' working lives. Even unions have half-forgotten
their mission. This is, perhaps, the most fundamental contrast between
Sweden and the United States.
197 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
198 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
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